Kremlin backs US NSS alignment: On December 7, Dmitry Peskov stated the US National Security Strategy is largely consistent with Russia’s vision and could help sustain talks toward peace in Ukraine; he called the NSS a positive step and noted it avoids listing Russia as a direct threat [1].
BAI targets Kharkiv GLOCs: ISW reports Russian battlefield air interdiction in northern Kharkiv Oblast aims to degrade Ukrainian ground logistics, including strikes on bridges near Staryi Saltiv and damage to the Pechenihy Dam, potentially hindering routes to Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, and Kupyansk [4][5][7].
Belarusian balloons enter NATO airspace: Lithuania’s Vilnius Airport suspended operations on December 6 due to balloons from Belarusian airspace, with ISW assessing this as part of Russia’s Phase Zero efforts and Belarus as a de facto ally in the Ukrainian war [12][14][15].
Ukrainian gains in Kostyantynivka area: ISW notes Ukrainian forces advanced northwest of Ivanopillya in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 7, while Russian claims of broader advances around Kostyantynivka lack independent confirmation [46][51].
Hulyaipole-front activity rises: Russian operations in Hulyaipole and eastern Dobropillya show reported advances on the eastern outskirts of Dobropillya and sustained strikes along the Hulyaipole corridor, with ongoing drone and glide-bomb activity noted by ISW [73][78][81]-[84].
Night-into-early December air campaign: Russia conducted a large drone and missile raid on December 6-7, with Ukrainian authorities downing about 175 drones and several missiles; strikes targeted energy, residential, and industrial infrastructure across multiple oblasts [93]. Zelensky highlighted the scale of drones, glide bombs, and missiles used in the prior week [94].
Who Said What
Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesperson: “The new US NSS is largely consistent with Russia’s vision and could be a modest guarantee that Russia and the United States will be able to continue working toward securing a peace settlement in Ukraine.” [1]
Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chair of the Russian Security Council: “The NSS unexpectedly aligns with Russia’s ideas about the need to share security and respect the sovereignty of states,” and that the window for dialogue is ajar. [3]
Some Context
BAI (battlefield air interdiction): Russian campaign targeting rear-area infrastructure (roads, bridges, rail) to disrupt Ukrainian GLOCs and enable future offensives.
GLOCs: Ground Lines of Communication; supply and evacuation routes used by front-line forces.
Haichur River bridge/dam strikes: Strategic crossings around Andriivka and Pechenihy Dam; damaging them can isolate or slow Ukrainian forces and hinder resupply.
Phase Zero: Russia’s broader informational and psychological campaign aimed at setting conditions for potential conflict escalation and influence over European security dynamics.
Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka area: A western Donetsk region corridor frequently contested in the current phase of the war; movements here are closely watched for indicators of shifting frontlines.
704 missiles and drones launched overnight by Russia, heavily targeting railway and energy infrastructure across Ukraine; Ukrainian Air Force reports 653 drones (majority Shahed-type), plus 34 cruise missiles and 14 ballistic missiles in the raid from multiple directions and occupied areas. Ukrainian forces downed 585 drones, 29 cruise missiles, and one ballistic missile; debris hit 29 sites and three locations received fragments. [1] [2]
Peace talks conditioned on Russian good faith: US-Ukrainian talks on December 4–5 framed progress toward a durable peace as dependent on Russia’s willingness to demonstrate long-term good faith; discussions covered security arrangements, deterrence, reconstruction, and post-war recovery. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi said a just peace requires a ceasefire along current front lines before negotiations. [9] [10] [11]
Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area logistics under pressure: Ukrainian forces reportedly hold positions in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad; Russian forces threaten Ukrainian logistics in the area with ongoing attacks and infiltration in the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad pocket, where front lines are highly intermingled. ISW notes Russia attempting to deny Ukrainian tactical and operational logistics while Ukraine maintains limited positions. [12] [13] [14] [18]
Chornobyl NSC safety compromised: A February 2025 Russian drone strike heavily damaged the New Safe Confinement (NSC) structure around reactor No. 4, impairing its safety functions; IAEA inspection confirms need for comprehensive repairs to ensure long-term nuclear safety. [19]
Russia seeks Indian labor and drone collaboration: Russia signaled willingness to accept an unlimited number of Indian migrant workers to address labor shortages; Moscow and Indian partners discussed drone production localization, with Kremlin officials citing joint production potential for Lancet drones and other weapons. [21][22][23][24]
Rising external support dynamics: Russia’s war effort reportedly relies on partnerships with India, North Korea, and the PRC; PRC-origin drone components and Garpiya production in China, North Korea’s drone production and materiel, and labor ties are highlighted as expanding factors in the conflict. [27] [28] [29] [30]
Who Said What
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky described the destruction of the Fastiv Rail Station as a result of Russian drone strikes, highlighting the impact on Kyiv region infrastructure. (Context: President of Ukraine commenting on battlefield and civilian infrastructure impact.) [5]
Rustem Umerov, Ukrainian Security and Defense Council Secretary, emphasized that peace progress hinges on Russia’s good faith and on a credible path to a just peace, including security guarantees and post-war reconstruction collaboration. (Context: US-Ukraine-National Security dialogue participants.) [10]
General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief, stated that a just peace would require a ceasefire along current front lines before negotiations, in an interview published by Sky News on December 6. (Context: Ukraine’s top military leadership position on negotiating terms.) [11]
Sergey Chemezov, head of Rostec, indicated Russia’s interest in localizing drone production in India as part of broader defence-industrial cooperation. (Context: Kremlin-linked industrial leadership outlining drone strategy with India.) [23]
Vladimir Putin, Russian President, described expanded technology sharing with India in shipbuilding and defence manufacturing during a December 4 interview, signaling deeper bilateral collaboration beyond arms sales. (Context: High-level Russian-Indian strategic partnership discourse.) [24]
Some Context
New Safe Confinement (NSC): A protective shell around the Chernobyl reactor shelter, designed to contain radioactive materials and maintain safety functions; damage to NSC impairs long-term safety of the site. This term is used in discussions of nuclear safety after a drone strike earlier in 2025. (Nuclear safety infrastructure concept.)
Kinzhal, Zircon, Iskander, KN-23: Types of missiles and glide weapons frequently mentioned in the campaign; Kinzhal is an air-launched aeroballistic missile, Zircon a hypersonic cruise missile, Iskander family includes ballistic missiles, and KN-23 is a coastal/ground-launched system. (Missile taxonomy.)
GLOCs: Ground Lines of Communication; routes and logistics used to move personnel, supplies, and equipment in a theater of operations. (Military logistics term.)
NSO/GRU/CAA/EMD terminology: References to Russian military branches and units (e.g., GRU intelligence, Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) used in assessment of battlefield deployments and unit activity. (Organizational context for Russian forces.)
Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket: A contested area where Ukrainian and Russian forces are in close proximity with disrupted logistics and minimal front-line delineation, complicating operations for both sides. (Geographic and tactical context.)
Sources: ISW Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments and linked briefing notes; Ukrainian and Russian official statements; IAEA statements; reporting cited in the article. Endnotes accompany each point as indicated in the source text. [1] [2] [5] [9] [10] [11] [19] [21][23][24]
Peace talks continue in Miami – Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov and Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov met with U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and former senior adviser Jared Kushner on December 4–5 in Miami, Florida, to discuss a possible settlement, following a briefing on the December 2 meeting between Witkoff and President Vladimir Putin [1][2].
Pokrovsk‑Myrnohrad pocket not yet encircled – Geolocated footage shows Russian forces advancing north and southeast of Myrnohrad and infiltrating northwestern Pokrovsk, but Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps commander Brigadier General Yevhen Lasiychuk reports that the pocket remains open and Ukrainian forces hold northern Pokrovsk [5][7].
Russian drones target Ukrainian logistics – Ukrainian artillery reports that Russian drones are attempting battlefield air interdiction (BAI) within a 50‑km radius of Pokrovsk, while Ukrainian forces work to widen ground lines of communication (GLOCs) north of the pocket [9][10].
Ukrainian strikes hit Russian DIB assets – Ukrainian forces struck the Temyruk seaport in Krasnodar Krai, the Syzran oil refinery in Samara Oblast, and the Balashovskaya substation in Volgograd Oblast, causing fires and operational disruptions [13][15][16].
Drones over French nuclear submarine base – Five unidentified drones flew over the Île Longue base on December 4; French Defence Minister Catherine Vautrin confirmed interception by marines or jamming systems, though the actor remains unidentified [19][20].
Russian war crime in Siversk – Footage from December 2 shows a Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade soldier executing a Ukrainian prisoner of war in Svyato‑Pokrovske; the channel claims it was “humane treatment” [24][25].
Who Said What
Rustem Umerov – Ukrainian delegation leader who met with U.S. envoys in Miami to discuss peace terms [1].
Steve Witkoff – U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East who briefed Ukrainian officials on the December 2 meeting with Putin [2].
Jared Kushner – Former senior adviser to the U.S. President who participated in the Miami talks [2].
Yuriy Ushakov – Russian Presidential aide who stated Russia awaited a response to the December 2 talks [4].
Yevhen Lasiychuk – Commander of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps who reported on the status of the Pokrovsk‑Myrnohrad pocket [7].
Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi – Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces commander who reported on strikes against Russian DIB facilities [16].
Some Context
Battlefield air interdiction (BAI) – A military tactic using drones or aircraft to disrupt enemy logistics and supply lines at operational depth.
Ground lines of communication (GLOCs) – Routes that allow a military force to move supplies, troops, and equipment from rear areas to the front.
Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies – A Russian elite drone unit tasked with targeting Ukrainian logistics and drone operators.
SSBN (nuclear‑powered ballistic‑missile submarine) – Submarines capable of launching nuclear missiles; the Île Longue base houses France’s four SSBNs.
DIB (Defense Industrial Base) – Russian industrial infrastructure that produces military equipment, including oil refineries and chemical plants.
Putin reiterates original war aims in India interview – President Vladimir Putin confirmed that Russia will end the conflict only when it achieves the objectives set at the start of the full‑scale invasion, including protection of ethnic Russians, the Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church, and a ban on further NATO expansion; he rejected the U.S. peace proposal and framed it as a continuation of the 2022 Istanbul agreement [1][2][3][4].
Kremlin officials maintain baseline demands – Leonid Slutsky and other State Duma members reiterated that Russia will not alter its core demands of prohibiting Ukrainian NATO membership, enforcing Ukrainian demilitarization, and “denazifying” the government, asserting that these goals can be fully achieved on the battlefield [6][7][8][9].
Kremlin frames future concessions on Odesa/Mykolaiv as “concessions” – Alexei Zhuravlev warned that Russian forces could launch an offensive on Odesa and Mykolaiv if Ukraine does not comply, portraying any future withdrawal of those cities as a Russian concession, despite Russia’s current inability to seize them by land or sea [10][11][12][13][14].
Russian forces have not encircled Myrnohrad – Ukrainian sources and ISW analysis find no evidence that Russian troops have surrounded Myrnohrad; Ukrainian ground lines of communication remain intact, with ongoing rotations and logistics into the town [17][18].
Russian infiltration and limited advances in eastern Ukraine – Russian units have conducted infiltration operations and made marginal gains in the Pokrovsk, Velykyi Burluk, and Kupyansk sectors, but have not secured decisive territorial control; Ukrainian forces continue to hold key positions and conduct counter‑attacks in these areas [19][20][21][45][46][47][48].
Russian cognitive‑warfare campaign targets Chernihiv – Russian media and social‑media posts spread narratives that Russian forces are preparing an offensive on Chernihiv City to pressure Ukraine amid peace talks; Ukrainian officials counter that Russia lacks the manpower and materiel for such an operation [22][23][24].
Who Said What
Vladimir Putin – In an India Today interview, he stated Russia will end the war only when its original objectives are met and rejected the U.S. peace proposal, framing it as a continuation of the 2022 Istanbul agreement [1][2][3][4].
Leonid Slutsky – As Chair of the State Duma International Affairs Committee, he declared that Russia will not change its basic demands, including a ban on Ukrainian NATO membership and demilitarization [6][7].
Alexei Zhuravlev – Deputy Chair of the State Duma Defense Committee, he warned that Russian forces could launch an offensive on Odesa and Mykolaiv if Ukraine does not comply, calling any future withdrawal a concession [10][11][12][13][14].
Ukrainian brigade spokesperson – Reported that Russian forces are infiltrating Pokrovsk in small fire‑teams and that Ukrainian forces maintain rotations and logistics in the area [21].
Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation – Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko warned that Russian narratives about a Chernihiv offensive are part of a cognitive‑warfare campaign aimed at pressuring Ukraine during peace negotiations [22].
Some Context
Denazification – A Kremlin‑used term meaning the removal of the current Ukrainian government, which it claims is “national‑socialist” or “neo‑Nazi”; widely regarded by analysts as a pretext for political control.
NATO Open Door Policy – NATO’s principle that any European country can join the alliance; Russia’s opposition to it is a core demand in its war aims.
Cognitive warfare – Information operations designed to shape perceptions and influence decision‑making, often through propaganda, disinformation, and staged narratives.
Iskander‑M ballistic missile – A Russian short‑range ballistic missile system capable of striking targets up to 500 km; used in recent strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
Black Sea Fleet (BSF) – Russia’s naval force operating in the Black Sea; its ability to conduct amphibious operations is limited by Ukrainian counter‑measures and loss of landing ships.
Child deportation program transports 88 youths from occupied Kherson and Donetsk to Russia for cultural indoctrination, funded by the “More than a New Year’s Fairytale” initiative linked to Rosmolodezh and other ministries. [1][2]
State National Policy decree signed Nov 25, 2025 mandates forced Russification of occupied Ukraine until 2036, requiring Russian language use and patriotic education across all four oblasts. [3][4][5]
Biometric passports issued in Donetsk begin with a four‑year‑old girl, embedding fingerprints, voice, and other data for surveillance and control. [16][17]
Pokrovsk residents receive Russian passports as part of evacuation efforts, indicating expansion of Russian administrative reach into partially controlled towns. [13][14]
+7Telekom expands wired coverage to occupied coastal towns, covering 40 % of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, integrating these areas into the Russian communications network. [23]
Russian real‑estate developers promote occupied Kherson and Luhansk as investment hubs, offering 2 % mortgage rates to attract Russian buyers and alter local demographics. [25][26][27][28]
Who Said What
Denis Pushilin (Donetsk People’s Republic head) stated that Russian passports were being issued to Pokrovsk civilians and that over 10,000 people remain in the area. [13][14]
Valentina Klimenko (Razvite LLC Development Director) told TASS that Russians are purchasing apartments in Kherson for investment, citing the region’s mild climate. [25][26]
Timur Vlasenko (property developer) reported that a 2 % mortgage rate is stimulating housing demand in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson. [27]
Vitaly Sukhanov (Monolit group Commercial Director) said the housing market in occupied Ukraine is attractive, especially coastal towns on the Sea of Azov. [28]
Sledkom investigators held a lecture on drone use for schoolchildren in Henichesk, illustrating law‑enforcement presence in schools. [10]
Some Context
State National Policy – Russia’s 2026 decree outlining integration of occupied territories into Russian civic identity, including language and patriotic education mandates.
Biometric passport – Russian passport with an embedded chip containing fingerprints, voice, and other personal data for surveillance purposes.
Sledkom – Russian Investigative Committee, a law‑enforcement body involved in investigations and deportations of Ukrainian citizens.
KrymPatriotCenter – Crimea‑based military‑patriotic organization that hosts youth competitions and training.
Luhansk Oblast occupation administration – Russian‑controlled local governing body responsible for administration in occupied Luhansk.
Rubio on Putin’s war theory – US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on December 2 that Putin’s assumption that Russia can outlast the West in a war of attrition is unrealistic; he noted that Russia holds less territory than early 2022 and Ukraine has reclaimed over 50 % of seized land, citing the interview with Fox News [1].
Kremlin refusal to discuss US‑Russia meeting – Kremlin officials, including spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, stated that negotiations with the United States are confidential and will not be publicly discussed, arguing that private talks are more effective, citing the Kremlin statement [6].
Odesa narrative revived – Russian State Duma Deputy Dmitry Pevtsov claimed that Odesa City is a Russian city and that Russia will resolve the war militarily so Russians can return to ancestral lands, citing the statement [9].
Russian tactical breakthrough near Hulyaipole – The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces achieved a 17‑kilometre breakthrough northeast of Hulyaipole in mid‑November 2025, concentrating forces comparable to those in the Pokrovsk‑Dobropillya sector, citing the assessment by Ukrainian observer Kostyantyn Mashovets [16].
Russian offensive operations across multiple fronts – Russian forces have not advanced significantly in Sumy, Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Borova, Slovyansk‑Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka, but continue attacks, citing sources [41][52][53][57][58][69][87][95][97].
Ukrainian advances and strikes – Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Dmitriyevka, the Livny depot, and conducted a large‑scale drone campaign, also advancing in various directions, citing sources [37][113].
Who Said What
Marco Rubio (US Secretary of State) – said Putin’s war theory is unrealistic and Russia cannot sustain a war of attrition; he emphasized Ukraine’s gains and Russia’s reduced territory [1].
Dmitry Peskov (Kremlin Spokesperson) – stated negotiations with the US are confidential and will not be discussed publicly; he argued private talks are more effective [6].
Dmitry Pevtsov (Russian State Duma Deputy) – claimed Odesa City is a Russian city and that Russia will resolve the war militarily to allow Russians to return to ancestral lands [9].
Sergei Lavrov (Russian Foreign Minister) – said Baltic and Moldovan governments discriminate against Russians, framing potential future conflict [28].
Espen Barth Eide (Norwegian Foreign Minister) – announced a $500 million aid package for Ukraine through the PURL initiative, with Germany and Poland co‑financing [35].
Some Context
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment (ROCA) – a weekly analysis by the Institute for the Study of War that evaluates Russian military operations in Ukraine [0].
Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF) – a Russian military formation operating in the eastern Ukrainian front, including the 35th and 5th Combined Arms Armies [16].
Haichur River – a river in the Dnipropetrovsk region that Russian forces aim to cross to advance toward Hulyaipole [20].
Shahed‑type drones – Iranian‑designed unmanned aerial vehicles used by Russia in the conflict, often deployed in large numbers [1.2].
PURL (Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List) – a procurement framework that allows NATO states to purchase U.S. weapons for Ukraine [35].
Putin rejects US‑Ukraine peace proposal: On Dec 2, President Vladimir Putin met a US delegation in Moscow and refused to accept any compromise short of his original war goals, despite the delegation presenting several options. The meeting ended without an agreement. [1][2][3]
Kremlin cognitive warfare and misinformation: Putin and senior commanders publicised alleged gains in Pokrovsk, Vovchansk, and other towns, but independent analysis finds no evidence of full Russian seizure; the claims appear aimed at shaping the negotiation narrative. [6][7][8][9][10][12][13][14][15][16][18]
Putin exaggerates Pokrovsk seizure: Putin described Pokrovsk as a “good base” for large‑scale breakthroughs, yet Ukrainian fortifications and limited Russian advances suggest the strategic value is overstated. [12][13][15][16][18]
Putin portrays Russian economy as resilient: At the VTB “Russia Calling!” forum he cited low unemployment (2.2 %), inflation at 7 %, and growing trade with China and India, while ignoring a 20 % inflation rate, a 50 % drop in oil‑gas revenue, and gold‑reserve sales. [19][20][21][22][23][24][25]
Putin deflects blame to Europe and threatens it: He blamed Europe for “unacceptable” peace proposals, warned of a potential war with Europe, and threatened NATO, aiming to deter European involvement in the peace process. [26][27][28][29][30][31]
Russian forces modify Shahed drones to target air defenses: New operator‑controlled Shahed drones equipped with R‑60 air‑to‑air missiles are being used to engage Ukrainian air‑defence systems, increasing battlefield air interdiction. [44][45][46][47][48]
Who Said What
Vladimir Putin: Declared rejection of the US‑Ukraine peace proposal, claimed Pokrovsk as a strategic base, portrayed the Russian economy as resilient, blamed Europe for “unacceptable” proposals, and threatened a war with Europe.
Yuriy Ushakov (Presidential aide): Reported that the US and Russian delegations discussed several options but did not reach a compromise, and later said European leaders were engaged in “destructive actions” in the peace process.
Alexei Chepa (Duma International Affairs Committee): Warned of a “dangerous trend” toward European militarisation and the risk of conflagration.
Viktor Sobolev (Duma Defense Committee): Claimed Europe was trying to protract the war until a conflict with Russia erupted.
Some Context
Cognitive warfare – Information operations designed to shape perceptions and influence decision‑making, often through misinformation or propaganda.
Shahed drone – A family of Iranian‑designed loitering munitions used by Russia; recent adaptations allow operator control and missile armament.
VTB “Russia Calling!” forum – An investment event hosted by Russia’s largest bank, used by officials to project economic resilience.
VAT (Value Added Tax) – Russia increased this tax from 20 % to 22 % on Nov 27 to support the federal budget amid economic strain.
Milblogger – A self‑identified military commentator on Russian social media who often publishes unverified claims about battlefield events.
Assadist officials funding coastal insurgency: Former Military Intelligence Chief Major General Kamal Hassan and Bashar al‑Assad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf have reportedly formed rival Alawite militias in Syria’s coastal provinces that aim to secede from the transitional government and restore Assad‑era power structures, according to 48 anonymous sources cited by Reuters [1].
Millions spent on recruitment and salaries: Hassan and Makhlouf are said to have spent more than $6 million and $1.5 million, respectively, to recruit and pay Alawite fighters in Syria and Lebanon, with funds funneled through a Lebanese charity set up by Hassan [2][5].
Competing for command‑and‑control rooms and caches: The two groups are vying for access to 14 former Assad‑era command‑and‑control centers and dozens of weapons caches along the coast, though the Tartous governor notes the centers have been weakened and poses no threat [3][4].
Security Service arrests of insurgent cells: The General Security Service detained a Makhlouf‑funded insurgent cell in Latakia in October and a pro‑Alawite commander in August, illustrating Makhlouf’s active support for coastal insurgent cells [7].
Fighter numbers likely exaggerated: Internal documents from the factions claim 54,000 and 12,000 fighters, but Reuters finds no evidence of such large mobilizations and notes many fighters are “ghost soldiers” accepting small payments without real loyalty [8][11].
IRGC Navy conducts high‑profile exercise: On 5 Dec, the IRGC Navy carried out a two‑day drill in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman, firing Ghadr‑110, Ghadr‑380, Ghadir and Sejjil anti‑ship cruise missiles, signalling deterrence against U.S. forces and preparing for maritime escalation [25][26][28].
Who Said What
Ahmed al Shami, governor of Tartous Province: “The centers have been significantly weakened and there is no concern about their continued existence.” [4]
Unnamed local Alawite militia commander: “The payments from Makhlouf and Hassan are insufficient but there is nothing wrong with taking some cash from these whales who sucked our blood for years.” [12]
Unnamed local Alawite militia commander: “Makhlouf attempted to buy our loyalty with crumbs of money.” [13]
Some Context
Alawite – A sect of Shia Islam that has historically dominated Syria’s ruling elite, especially during Bashar al‑Assad’s presidency.
General Security Service (GSS) – Syria’s domestic intelligence agency responsible for counter‑insurgency and internal security.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Iran’s elite military force that operates separate from the regular army and conducts strategic operations, including naval drills.
Sejjil missile – An Iranian anti‑ship cruise missile with an estimated range of 180 km, used for the first time in the 5 Dec drill.
Sahand 2025 exercise – A counter‑terrorism training event organized by Iran’s IRGC Ground Forces, attended by all members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to showcase Iran’s security capabilities.
Maliki promises to disarm militias if US backs his PM bid – Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al‑Maliki told U.S. officials through unnamed mediators that he would disarm Iranian‑backed Iraqi militias if Washington supports his candidacy for prime minister, according to a senior Iraqi source speaking to a Kurdish journalist on December 3 [1].
Iraq reverses terrorist designations of Houthis and Hezbollah – The Iraqi Committee for Freezing Terrorist Funds removed the Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah from its list of designated terrorist organizations in mid‑November 2025, a decision later reversed under pressure from Iranian‑backed Iraqi actors, prompting an investigation ordered by Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al‑Sudani on December 4 [13‑17].
“Outlaws” blamed for Khor Mor gas‑field drone attack – The Iraqi federal government accused unnamed “outlaws” of launching two drones that struck the Emirati‑operated Khor Mor gas field on November 26, citing a committee report that the attackers originated from eastern Tuz Kharmatu District, though no militia claimed responsibility [20‑23].
Turkey signals it will drop SDF terrorist label – Justice and Development Party spokesperson Omer Celik told Turkish media that the Syrian Democratic Forces would no longer be considered a terrorist organization if they hand over airports, border crossings, and oil fields to the Syrian government under the March 10 agreement [36‑39].
IRGC Navy conducts two‑day Gulf exercise – On December 4 the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy held a two‑day exercise in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman, announcing it had notified U.S. vessels and framing the drill as a “dual message” of peace to partners and warning to adversaries [45‑48].
Iraqi electoral commission completes appeals review – The Electoral Judicial Panel finished reviewing 853 appeals to the November 2025 parliamentary election results and will forward the certified results to the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court for ratification, initiating the government‑formation process [62‑63].
Who Said What
Nouri al‑Maliki – “I will disarm Iranian‑backed militias if the United States supports my bid to become prime minister.” Source: unnamed senior Iraqi official, Kurdish journalist interview, December 3[1].
Omer Celik (AKP spokesperson) – “The SDF will cease to be a threat to Turkey and a terrorist organization if it hands over key resources to the Syrian government.” Source: Turkish media interview, December 2 [36‑37].
IRGC Navy commander – “We alerted U.S. vessels about the exercise and sent a dual message of peace to partners and a warning to adversaries.” Source: IRGC Navy statement, December 4 [45‑47].
Some Context
Shia Coordination Framework – A loose coalition of Shia political parties in Iraq, many of which receive support from Iran, that has controlled the federal government since 2022 and is a key player in selecting the next prime minister.
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – An Iraqi state security umbrella that includes several Iranian‑backed militias; its status and command structure are central to U.S. pressure on Iraq to reduce Iranian influence.
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – A multi‑ethnic militia group led by the Kurdish YPG, historically linked to the PKK; designated a terrorist organization by Turkey and the U.S. until the March 10 integration agreement.
IRGC Navy – The naval branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, responsible for protecting Iranian maritime interests and conducting deterrent exercises in the Persian Gulf.
Khor Mor gas field – An Emirati‑operated natural‑gas facility in Sulaymaniyah Province, Iraq, that was targeted by a drone attack on November 26, 2025.
Militia threatens US envoy – On December 3, Akram al‑Kaabi, head of the Iranian‑backed Harakat Hezbollah al‑Nujaba, publicly warned that his militia would “shove a rock down Mark Savaya’s mouth” if the United States continued what he called “blatant interference” in Iraqi affairs. The threat came after Savaya reportedly pressured the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian‑backed candidates from the premiership and key ministries, a move that could undermine the militia’s influence in the ongoing government‑formation process. The militia’s leadership has indicated that an actual attack would likely backfire by jeopardizing its domestic political objectives and provoking US retaliation. [1][4][5][6]
US pressure splits Shia Coordination Framework – Iraqi media reported that the Shia Coordination Framework failed to agree on a prime minister during a December 2 meeting, citing internal divisions over US demands to bar Iranian‑backed figures. Candidates on the table included Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al‑Sudani, former PM Nouri al‑Maliki, and intelligence chief Hamid al‑Shatri. The framework’s hesitation reflects broader tensions between Iranian influence and US pressure to limit the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an Iraqi state security service largely composed of Iranian‑backed militias. US officials have threatened sanctions against PMF leaders if Iraq does not dissolve the force, a stance that has split framework members into camps wary of sanctions versus those concerned about US strikes. [10][12][15][17][18][19]
Iran seeks Russian laser‑tech for anti‑drone systems – The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that in 2024 Iran travelled to Russia to obtain laser‑based conventional military technology, focusing on anti‑drone and anti‑ballistic missile systems rather than nuclear weapon validation. The move follows a series of Israeli drone strikes on Iranian facilities in 2021‑2023, which have prompted Iran to develop cheaper, laser‑based air‑defense solutions. Russia’s recent deployment of truck‑mounted laser systems to counter Ukrainian drones provides a likely knowledge transfer pathway. [20][21][22][23][24][25][27]
US forces relocate to Iraqi Kurdistan – On November 26, Lt. Gen. Qais al‑Muhammadawi announced that all US‑led coalition troops in Iraq had moved to the Kurdistan Region as part of the planned withdrawal, leaving only 250‑350 advisors at Ain al‑Asad Airbase in Anbar Province to support operations against ISIS in Syria. The move follows a September 2024 agreement to reduce US personnel from 2,500 to under 2,000 by the end of 2026, with a joint committee slated to negotiate a memorandum of understanding on future US presence. [33][34][35][36]
Israel‑Lebanon ceasefire talks resume – Israeli and Lebanese delegations, led respectively by Uri Rasnick and former ambassador Simon Karam, met on December 3 at a ceasefire‑monitoring committee in Naqoura. Discussions covered Hezbollah disarmament, Israeli strikes in Lebanon, and potential economic cooperation in the south. While the meeting was seen as a positive step toward dialogue, no substantive changes were made on key outstanding issues such as the Lebanese Armed Forces’ search of private property. [39][40][41][42][43][44][45]
Iran expands ties with African partners – In late November and early December, Iranian officials met with foreign ministers of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, and led a delegation to Uganda to strengthen economic and defense cooperation. The meetings focused on energy, finance, health, mining, and engineering agreements, and on securing access to uranium and other resources to mitigate sanctions. Iran has also supplied drones to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara since 2021, and has sought naval base or port access in Sudan and Niger in exchange for military aid. [48][49][50][51][52][53][54]
Who Said What
Akram al‑Kaabi – “We will shove a rock down Mark Savaya’s mouth” if the United States continues its interference.
Mark Savaya – Pressured the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian‑backed candidates from the premiership and key ministries.
Uri Rasnick – Led the Israeli delegation to the ceasefire‑monitoring committee, emphasizing Hezbollah disarmament and economic cooperation.
Simon Karam – Led the Lebanese delegation, noting that Israel would allow the Lebanese Armed Forces a chance to disarm Hezbollah.
Grand Ayatollah Ali al‑Sistani – Declared he would not interfere in the selection of Iraq’s next prime minister.
Some Context
Shia Coordination Framework – A loose coalition of Shia political parties in Iraq, many of which are the political wings of Iranian‑backed militias.
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – An Iraqi state security service largely composed of Iranian‑backed militias, often involved in internal security and counter‑terrorism.
Laser‑based conventional military systems – Non‑nuclear laser technologies used for air defense, such as anti‑drone and anti‑ballistic missile systems.
CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) – The U.S. military command responsible for the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, which has deployed drone forces in the region.
Hezbollah – A Lebanese Shia Islamist militant group and political party that receives support from Iran and has been involved in conflicts with Israel.
Sahand 2025 counter‑terrorism exercise – Iran staged a five‑day drill from Dec 1‑5 at the IRGC Ground Forces’ Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade in East Azerbaijan Province, inviting delegations from all ten Shanghai Cooperation Organization members, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Oman, and Iraq as observers.[1][3][5]
First‑person view drones deployed – IRGC‑affiliated media released images of Iranian forces operating FPV drones during the exercise, a technology widely used by Russia and Ukraine that provides near‑transparent battlefield situational awareness and can support counter‑insurgency or protest suppression operations.[6]
US envoy pressures Iraqi Shia coalition – Mark Savaya urged the Shia Coordination Framework to bar Iranian‑backed candidates from the premiership and key ministries, prompting the coalition to consider a “consensus candidate” acceptable to both regional and international actors.[8][10]
Suwayda National Guard arrests and killings – On Nov 28 the Guard detained ten Druze leaders, accusing them of conspiring with the Syrian transitional government; subsequent torture and the death of Sheikh Raed al Matni on Dec 2 were reported, indicating a crackdown aimed at deterring dissent in Suwayda Province.[15][18][19]
PKK leader proposes SDF integration – Abdullah Ocalan outlined a plan for the Syrian Democratic Forces to join the Syrian Ministry of Defense while retaining internal security structures, a stance that aligns with the SDF’s federalist vision but clashes with the Syrian government’s centralization agenda.[24][26]
Iranian military leadership reshuffle – The Artesh and IRGC announced new appointments: Brig. Gen. Bahador Khajehvand became commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Northeastern Regional Headquarters, and Brig. Gen. Esmali Khalilzadeh was named deputy commander of the Hamzeh Sayyid ol Shohada Operational Base, among other changes.[31]
Who Said What
Mark Savaya (US Special Envoy to Iraq) – “We are urging the Shia Coordination Framework to exclude Iranian‑backed candidates from key government positions.” [8]
Iraqi political sources – “The framework discussed its response to Savaya on Dec 1 and is considering a consensus candidate.” [10]
Suwayda National Guard spokesperson – “The arrested individuals were involved in a conspiracy to attack the autonomous government.” [15]
Abdullah Ocalan (PKK leader) – “The SDF should join the Syrian Ministry of Defense while maintaining its own security forces.” [24]
Some Context
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – An intergovernmental alliance of eight Eurasian states, including Russia, China, and Iran, focused on security, economic, and cultural cooperation, with counter‑terrorism as a key priority.
First‑person view (FPV) drone – A small, piloted or autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle equipped with a camera that streams live video to the operator, enabling real‑time battlefield surveillance and targeting.
Shia Coordination Framework – A loose coalition of Iraqi Shia political parties, many of which receive support from Iran, that plays a central role in forming the Iraqi government.
Suwayda National Guard – A paramilitary force aligned with the Suwayda Autonomous Government in southern Syria, tasked with maintaining internal security and countering opposition groups.
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – A Kurdish militant organization operating primarily in Turkey, designated as a terrorist group by several countries, whose leadership has historically engaged in negotiations with Turkish authorities.
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – A multi‑ethnic coalition of Kurdish, Arab, and Assyrian militias that has controlled large parts of northeastern Syria since 2015 and has been a key partner of the United States in the fight against ISIS.
Iran rearming partners for a potential Israel‑Hezbollah conflict – An Israeli security source told Israeli media on 30 Nov that Iran is supplying arms, drones and missiles to Hezbollah, the Houthis, and unspecified groups in the West Bank and Syria in preparation for a possible Israeli operation against Hezbollah. The source said Iran is in an “arms race” because it expects Israel to strike Lebanon if Hezbollah is not disarmed by 31 Dec [1][2][3].
US warns Iraq to curb militia support for Hezbollah – U.S. Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al Sudani that Israel plans an operation against Hezbollah and that Iraq must stop any militia activity that supports Hezbollah financially or militarily, or it risks Israeli strikes on Iraq. Barrack also warned that U.S. forces would act against any Iranian‑backed militia interfering with U.S. operations in the region. The warning was reported on 1 Dec [4][5].
Iraqi militias hesitant to engage Israel due to political fallout – The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee’s denial of involvement in the 26 Nov drone attack on the Khor Mor gas field, coupled with the ongoing government‑formation process, shows that Iranian‑backed militias fear domestic political repercussions if they participate in a conflict with Israel. The militias have historically avoided claiming attacks that could drag Iraq into war ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections. Sources: 10, 11.
Hezbollah prefers indirect retaliation and may involve Houthis – Hezbollah is pursuing a “dual objective” of retaliating for the death of senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai while avoiding a full‑scale war. Reports indicate Hezbollah may request the Houthis to strike Israel on its behalf, but the Houthis have limited willingness to engage in broader escalation. Sources: 12–16.
Jaish al Adl merges with other Baloch militias and continues attacks – On 29 Nov Jaish al Adl announced a merger with other Baloch groups and pledged to keep operating in Iran. The group has carried out attacks on Iranian security forces, including killing an IRGC officer and two Basij members in Sistan‑and‑Baluchistan in early November. Sources: 19–21.
Iranian Artesh Navy unveils new vessels, expanding maritime capabilities – On 29 Nov the Artesh Navy unveiled the Kurdistan floating‑base vessel and showcased the renovated Sahand destroyer in Bandar Abbas. The Kurdistan carries anti‑ship missiles, air‑defence missiles and long‑range drones, and the navy plans to name a new floating base Khuzestan. These ships are part of Iran’s broader effort to build forward‑base and long‑range surface vessels. Sources: 25–34.
Who Said What
Israeli security source – “Iran is rearming its regional partners for a potential Israeli operation against Hezbollah.”
Thomas Barrack (U.S. Special Envoy) – “Iraq must stop any militia activity that supports Hezbollah, or it risks Israeli strikes on Iraq.”
Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba member – “We have developed an advanced security plan to improve our drone and missile capabilities in preparation for any upcoming military operation against Israel.”
Hezbollah representative – “We are seeking indirect retaliation for the death of our senior commander while avoiding a full‑scale war.”
Jaish al Adl spokesperson – “We have merged with other Baloch groups and will continue our activities in Iran.”
Rear Admiral Shahram Irani (Artesh Navy) – “The Kurdistan floating base will serve as a long‑endurance support ship for future naval operations.”
Some Context
Axis of Resistance – A coalition of Iran‑backed groups in the Middle East, including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various Iraqi militias, that coordinate against Israel and U.S. influence.
Artesh Navy – The regular navy of Iran, distinct from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy, responsible for protecting Iran’s territorial waters and projecting power beyond the Persian Gulf.
Kurdistan floating‑base vessel – A new class of Iranian naval ship designed to serve as a mobile logistics and combat support platform, equipped with missiles, drones and air‑defence systems.
Jaish al Adl – A Baloch Salafi‑jihadi militia active in southeastern Iran, known for attacks on Iranian security forces and for its role in the Mahsa Amini protests.
Houthis – An Iranian‑backed Shia insurgent group in Yemen that has engaged in maritime attacks against Israeli and international shipping.
Israel sets December 7 deadline for LAF to curb Hezbollah – Israeli officials announced that the Lebanese Armed Forces must show measurable progress in disarming Hezbollah by December 7, a date tied to upcoming visits by Pope Leo XIV and U.S. Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus to Beirut, after which Israel may consider a military operation in Lebanon. The deadline follows a “special discussion” on November 27 in which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s defense team presented enforcement plans and warned of increased Israeli actions along the northern border if Hezbollah reconstitutes. [1]
LAF claims 80 % of disarmament plan completed – Southern Sector Commander Brigadier General Nicholas Tabet reported on November 28 that the LAF has implemented 80 % of its disarmament strategy in southern Lebanon and will not seek an extension to the end‑of‑year deadline, citing evidence that Israel has not provided proof of new weapons entering the area. He also accused Israel of targeting civilian homes and of hindering LAF operations. [11]
Iranian‑backed militias strike Khor Mor gas field – On November 26, a drone attack by Iraqi militias linked to Iran damaged the Emirati‑operated Khor Mor gas field in Chamchamal District, Sulaymaniyah Province, sparking a fire but causing no casualties. The Kurdistan Regional Government halted gas supplies to power plants, cutting electricity in Iraqi Kurdistan by 75 %. An investigative committee led by Interior Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is set to report on the incident on December 1. [20]
Iran denies Saudi mediation role in nuclear talks – Reuters reported on November 20 that Iran had asked Saudi Arabia to persuade the United States to revive stalled nuclear negotiations, a claim dismissed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a “pure lie.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also denied that President Masoud Pezeshkian’s letter to Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman was related to the nuclear issue, asserting that U.S. behavior alone blocks talks. [31]
Supreme Leader orders crackdown on hijab violations – On November 25, Ali Khamenei reportedly instructed the Intelligence Ministry to intensify enforcement of Iran’s mandatory hijab law after a report indicating increased non‑compliance among women. The directive followed a demonstration supporting hijab enforcement at Tehran University on November 28, reflecting hard‑liner pressure amid concerns that lax enforcement could spark unrest. [41]
Hezbollah receives funds through UAE channels – A senior U.S. official told the Wall Street Journal on November 27 that Iran has funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah via UAE‑based money exchanges, private companies, and couriers, exploiting the country’s financial networks to evade sanctions. The U.S. Treasury reported that at least $1 billion was smuggled to Hezbollah in 2025, mostly through Lebanese money‑exchange companies. [57]
Who Said What
Israeli Channel 13 journalist – Reported that the LAF has until after the Pope’s and U.S. envoy’s visits to Beirut to show progress, implying potential Israeli military action if the deadline is missed.
Brig. Gen. Nicholas Tabet (LAF) – Stated that 80 % of the disarmament plan is completed and that Israel has not provided evidence of new weapons entering southern Lebanon.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – Declared that reports of a U.S. mediation message were “pure lies” and that Iran’s nuclear negotiations are stalled solely due to U.S. demands.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi – Rejected claims that President Pezeshkian’s letter to Saudi Arabia concerned the nuclear issue, emphasizing U.S. behavior as the main obstacle.
U.S. Treasury officials – Confirmed that Iran smuggled $1 billion to Hezbollah in 2025 through Lebanese money‑exchange companies.
Some Context
Hezbollah – A Lebanese Shia Islamist militant group and political party that receives support from Iran and is designated a terrorist organization by several countries.
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) – The national military of Lebanon, tasked with maintaining security and, per U.S. and Israeli demands, disarming Hezbollah.
Khor Mor Gas Field – An Emirati‑operated natural gas extraction site in Iraqi Kurdistan that has been targeted by Iranian‑backed militias to influence Kurdish political dynamics.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force – The foreign operations branch of Iran’s IRGC, responsible for supporting allied groups such as Hezbollah and various Iraqi militias.
Mandatory Hijab Law – Iran’s legal requirement that women wear a hijab in public; enforcement has intensified under hard‑liner pressure in recent months.
Western‑origin nuclear tech claim – An Iranian front company, Imen Gostar Raman Kish, announced it uses radiation‑detection tubes from UK‑based Centronic and components from US‑based Elijen Technology, despite no evidence those suppliers knew they were selling to Iran [1][3][4].
US sanctions on company leaders – The United States imposed sanctions on the chairperson and vice chairperson of Imen Gostar Raman Kish in October 2025 for proliferation activities, and the chief executive, Javad Ghasemi, was part of a covert Iranian delegation that visited Russian dual‑use research institutes in August 2024 and again in November 2024 to seek laser technology for nuclear weapons validation [5][6][7].
Limited repair of main nuclear sites – Satellite imagery shows Iran has made minimal progress repairing its three primary nuclear facilities—Natanz, Fordow, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center—since the Israel‑Iran war, with only “little activity” recorded at these sites [21].
Extensive clean‑up at weaponization sites – The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reports that Iran has conducted extensive clean‑up at four weaponization sites struck during the war, including the SPND headquarters in Tehran and the Shahid Meisami Research Center in Alborz Province, activities that may precede rebuilding or serve sanitization purposes [8][9][10][12][13].
Israeli warning on Hezbollah disarmament – Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz told the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on November 26 that Israel will expand operations in Lebanon if Hezbollah is not disarmed by year‑end, citing the U.S. 2025 disarmament proposal and the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm only south of the Litani River [25][26][27][28][29].
Hezbollah’s rebuilding and smuggling activity – Senior Israeli officials report that Hezbollah’s rebuilding rate currently outpaces Israel’s dismantling capacity, and that the group has smuggled hundreds of rockets from Syria into Lebanon, while the IDF has destroyed rocket storage and production sites in the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon in recent weeks [31][32][33][34].
Who Said What
Israel Katz – Israeli Defense Minister; warned that Israel will expand operations in Lebanon if Hezbollah is not disarmed by the end of 2025, citing U.S. and Lebanese disarmament plans [25].
Senior Israeli official (unnamed) – Stated that Hezbollah’s rebuilding rate is outpacing Israel’s ability to dismantle the group, and that the IDF must degrade Hezbollah to a level where the Lebanese Armed Forces become militarily stronger [31][34].
Senior Israeli official (unnamed) – Reported that Hezbollah has smuggled hundreds of rockets from Syria into Lebanon, highlighting ongoing supply lines [32].
Israeli media (unnamed) – Noted that the IDF has identified and destroyed Hezbollah military infrastructure, including rocket storage and production facilities, in the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon [33].
Some Context
SPND (Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research) – A former Iranian nuclear weapons research organization that played a leading role before 2003 and now operates as a front for procurement of dual‑use technology.
Hezbollah – A Lebanese Shia militant group and political party that Israel considers a terrorist organization; its disarmament is a key security issue for Israel and Lebanon.
LAF (Lebanese Armed Forces) – The national military of Lebanon, tasked with enforcing the country’s disarmament plan for Hezbollah.
Litani River – A river in southern Lebanon; the Lebanese government’s disarmament plan limits Hezbollah’s disarmament to the area south of this river.
Natanz, Fordow, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center – Iran’s primary nuclear research and enrichment facilities, heavily damaged during the Israel‑Iran war and largely untouched since.
$40B Special Budget Announced – President Lai announced on Nov 25 a $40 billion special budget for asymmetric warfare covering 2026‑2033, the largest in Taiwan’s history and twice the size of the second‑largest budget approved in Oct 2025, earmarked for precision artillery, long‑range munitions, anti‑aircraft and anti‑tank missiles, unmanned vehicles, drone countermeasures, and AI‑assisted C2 systems [1][2][3][4].
KMT and TPP Oppose the Bill – The Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party have organized opposition to the budget, arguing it lacks detail on procurement and integration, and that it could undermine Taiwan’s defense readiness and international perception of resilience; their stance echoes CCP narratives labeling the spending as provocative and U.S.‑oriented [15][16][17][18][19].
Hai Kun Submarine Trials Continue – The indigenously built Hai Kun submarine completed sea‑acceptance trials on Nov 26‑27, yet KMT lawmakers still criticize equipment deficiencies and have frozen funding for the next seven submarines until trials conclude, potentially delaying the navy’s ability to counter a blockade [22][23][24][25][26][27].
Civil‑Military Reconnaissance Proposal – Apex Aviation, a Taiwanese airline, has proposed converting a propeller aircraft with a U.S. synthetic‑aperture radar for government reconnaissance of PRC vessels, offering a lower‑cost alternative to military aircraft and aligning with Lai’s push for civilian participation in defense [31][32][33].
CCG Incursions Around Kinmen – In November 2025, four China Coast Guard ships entered Taiwan‑restricted waters around Kinmen on Nov 13, 20, and 28, a move aimed at eroding Taiwan’s sovereignty and testing its response, while Taiwan designates these waters as “prohibited” and “restricted” zones [34].
PRC Releases Nuclear White Paper – On Nov 27, the PRC published its first nuclear white paper since 2005, framing itself as a responsible nuclear power, reiterating a no‑first‑use policy, and calling for arms‑control mechanisms, amid U.S. nuclear testing announcements and regional missile deployments [42][43][44][45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52].
Who Said What
Cheng Li‑wun (KMT Chairwoman) – Criticized the budget as provocative and harmful to Taiwan’s security, echoing CCP rhetoric that the spending serves U.S. interests [17].
Ma Wen‑chun (KMT lawmaker, Foreign Affairs & Defense Committee co‑chair) – Accused the Lai administration of “taking orders” from the United States and called the budget a waste of funds, citing equipment deficiencies in the Hai Kun submarine [18][25].
PRC Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson – Denounced the Lai administration for “squandering funds” to pander to “external powers,” framing the budget as a provocation [19].
Some Context
T‑Dome – Taiwan’s integrated air‑defense concept that layers low, medium, and high‑altitude systems with maneuverable platforms to counter missile and drone attacks.
PLA (People’s Liberation Army) – The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China, which have outlined a joint firepower strike campaign targeting Taiwan’s critical infrastructure before an invasion.
Hai Kun – The first indigenously built diesel‑electric attack submarine for Taiwan’s navy, intended to enhance anti‑blockade capabilities.
CCG (China Coast Guard) – The maritime law‑enforcement agency of the PRC, which conducts patrols and incursions in waters near Taiwan and other disputed areas.
PRC Nuclear White Paper – A policy document outlining China’s stance on nuclear weapons, no‑first‑use policy, and calls for arms‑control mechanisms, released in 2025.
PLA uses civilian vessels in amphibious exercise: In July–August 2025 the People’s Liberation Army deployed six roll‑on, roll‑off (RORO) ships and six deck cargo vessels to unload military vehicles onto a beach, a first known use of civilian cargo ships for such a landing; satellite imagery also shows a self‑propelled temporary pier system in use, indicating PRC preparations for a potential invasion of Taiwan, though civilian vessels are vulnerable to Taiwan’s short‑range weapons. [1][2][3]
Taiwan expands drone and satellite capabilities: On November 20 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a “drone diplomacy” initiative to deepen supply‑chain cooperation with foreign partners, following a Warsaw Security Forum visit, and opened a new low‑earth‑orbit satellite training base to improve communications redundancy amid PRC threats to undersea cables. [6][8]
PRC escalates pressure on Japan over Taiwan comments: After Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said a war over Taiwan could threaten Japan, the PRC postponed a trilateral summit, cancelled Japanese cultural events, refused to meet at the G20, threatened economic measures, and posted on X that it could take military action against Japan without UN Security Council approval. [13][14][15][16][18][19]
PRC state media promotes Ryukyu independence: A Global Times editorial urged the establishment of “Ryukyu Studies” in PRC universities, linked to PRC claims over the islands, and suggested that the US and Japan might involve the Ryukyu archipelago in a conflict against the PRC, potentially eroding Japanese sovereignty. [21][22][23][24]
Taiwan prosecutes espionage network: On November 18 the High Prosecutors’ Office indicted PRC national Ding Xiaofu and six Taiwanese military personnel for spying, the first case since 2015 involving a PRC agent traveling to Taiwan; the charges carry a minimum five‑year sentence and include a $356,444 transfer of funds to Taiwan to support the operation. [33][34][35][36][37][38][39]
US Senate codifies Six Assurances to Taiwan: On November 20 the Senate introduced the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act to formalize the 1982 commitments, preventing future administrations from altering assurances without Congressional approval and reaffirming six provisions such as no set end date for arms sales and no mediation role. [40][41][42]
Who Said What
Jiang Zhenwei (Senior Taiwanese Foreign Affairs Ministry official) announced the “drone diplomacy” initiative to deepen cooperation and supply‑chain ties. [6]
Liu Jen‑yuan (Presidential Strategic Adviser) was appointed deputy national defense minister, replacing Pai Hung‑hui. [10]
Mao Ning (Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson) accused Japan of accelerating rearmament and facilitating nuclear technology sharing, and demanded that PM Takaichi retract her statement for dialogue. [31][32][16]
PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson stated that Takaichi must retract her statement as a prerequisite to dialogue. [16]
PRC embassy in Japan posted on X that it could take military action against Japan without UN Security Council approval. [19]
Some Context
RORO (Roll‑On, Roll‑Off) – A type of cargo vessel that allows wheeled cargo to be driven on and off the ship, used by the PLA to transport military vehicles for amphibious operations.
Temporary pier system – A self‑propelled, modular pier that can be deployed to facilitate beach landings without existing port infrastructure.
Low‑Earth‑Orbit (LEO) satellite – Satellites orbiting at altitudes of 500–2,000 km, used for rapid communications and data relay; Taiwan’s new training base enhances redundancy against undersea cable disruptions.
Six Assurances – Semi‑official commitments made by the U.S. in 1982 to Taiwan, covering arms sales, mediation, and sovereignty issues; the 2025 Act would codify these assurances into law.
Ryukyu Islands – A Japanese archipelago south of the main islands; PRC state media’s promotion of “Ryukyu Studies” seeks to influence perceptions of sovereignty and potential separatist sentiment.
PRC escalates pressure on Japan after Takaichi remarks – The Chinese Communist Party condemned Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s warning that a Taiwan war could threaten Japan, threatened personal violence, issued a travel advisory, banned Japanese seafood imports, and conducted drone and live‑fire drills near Japanese waters [1][2][3][4][5].
PLA Navy trials the Type 076 amphibious assault ship “Sichuan” – From 14‑16 Nov the PLA conducted sea trials of Sichuan, a 50,000‑ton vessel with a CATOBAR system capable of launching large drones, potentially extending China’s carrier‑based force projection [6][7][8][9][10][11].
PLA intensifies ideological loyalty to Xi amid purges – Vice‑Chair Zhang Youxia urged total loyalty to Xi Jinping in a People’s Daily essay; the PLA Daily reported study sessions and purges of senior officers, including the removal of CMC political work director Miao Hua and Vice‑Chair He Weidong, to reinforce Xi’s control [12][13][14][15].
KMT Vice‑Chair Chang Jung‑kung meets PRC officials – Chang met Shanghai’s Taiwan Affairs Office and CCP Shanghai Committee Secretary, promoted a shared “Chinese” identity for Taiwanese, and called for cross‑strait exchanges under the 1992 Consensus, echoing PRC rhetoric and seeking to influence Taiwan’s politics [15][16][17][18][19][20][21].
US approves $330 million arms sale to Taiwan – The Department of Defense authorized spare parts for Taiwan’s F‑16, Indigenous Defense Fighter, and C‑130 aircraft, citing political stability and military balance; the sale follows a prior Trump‑era suspension of aid and aligns with Taiwan’s defense budget goals [31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39].
PRC bans four elite universities from PLA procurement – Beijing Institute of Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering University, and Beijing Jiaotong University were barred for bid‑rigging; the ban is part of a broader anti‑corruption campaign targeting PLA procurement and research partnerships [40][41][42][43].
Who Said What
Zhang Youxia (Vice‑Chair, Central Military Commission) – “All military members must exercise total loyalty to Xi and his Leninist ideology.” [12]
PLA Daily (official PLA newspaper) – Reported purges of senior officers, framing them as Xi’s effort to suppress ideological opposition. [14]
Chang Jung‑kung (KMT Vice‑Chair) – “People who are authentic Taiwanese should also be openly and confidently Chinese.” [16]
Cheng Li‑wun (KMT Chair) – “Cross‑strait tensions would cease if Taiwan accepted that there is only one China.” [19]
U.S. Department of Defense – “The sale will ensure political stability, military balance, and economic advancement in the Indo‑Pacific.” [32]
PRC State Media (reporting on university bans) – “The four universities are banned for bid‑rigging.” [40]
Some Context
Type 076 amphibious assault ship – A 50,000‑ton vessel with a CATOBAR system, enabling launch of large drones and enhancing China’s amphibious and carrier‑based operations.
CATOBAR (Catapult‑Assisted Take‑Off, Arrested Recovery) – A launch system that allows heavier aircraft or drones to take off from a ship, unlike the older STOBAR system.
1992 Consensus – An alleged agreement between the CCP and KMT that there is one China, with differing interpretations of its government, used to justify cross‑strait policies.
Nexperia – A Dutch‑based chipmaker owned by the Chinese firm Wingtech; its seizure and subsequent release illustrate China’s leverage over critical supply chains.
“Seven Sons of National Defense” – Seven Chinese universities with deep research ties to the PLA, often involved in defense technology development.
US‑PRC trade truce upheld: On Oct 30, President Trump and Xi Jinping met and pledged to reduce economic tensions; both sides enacted measures such as suspending port‑fee investigations and port‑fee suspensions, signaling willingness to cooperate [1][4].
MOFCOM suspends rare‑earth export controls: On Nov 7, China lifted controls on rare‑earth minerals and lithium battery materials first imposed Oct 9, and on Nov 9 it removed limits on dual‑use items like gallium and germanium, easing export restrictions to the United States [2][3].
Taiwan Vice President addresses IPAC in Brussels: On Nov 7, Hsiao Bi‑Khim became the first Taiwanese vice president to speak at the Inter‑Parliamentary Alliance on China, marking Taiwan’s full membership and prompting Chinese diplomatic criticism of IPAC as anti‑China [7][12][13].
Japanese PM signals JSDF use against Taiwan: On Nov 7, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that Japan could mobilize the Self‑Defense Forces if the PLA used force against Taiwan, the first public acknowledgment of such a stance and a shift toward stronger Taiwan support [15][16][17][18][19].
Commissioning of PLA Type‑003 carrier Fujian: On Nov 7, China commissioned its first indigenously designed aircraft carrier, Fujian, equipped with CATOBAR and electromagnetic catapults, and assigned it to the Southern Theater Command to enhance far‑sea power projection [47][48][49][50][51].
PRC signs economic partnership with Pacific islands: On Nov 4, China’s Commerce Minister Wang Wentao signed a framework agreement with Nauru, Micronesia, Kiribati, Vanuatu, and Fiji, aiming to deepen economic ties and expand influence in the South Pacific [78][79][80].
Who Said What
Hsiao Bi‑Khim (Taiwan Vice President) – “Taiwan needs increased cooperation and support” during her IPAC address [7].
Sanae Takaichi (Japanese Prime Minister) – “A situation threatening Japan’s survival” when describing a PLA‑Taiwan conflict [15].
Xue Jian (PRC Consul General, Osaka) – Threatened to “cut off the filthy necks” of those intervening; post later deleted [20].
Lin Jian (PRC MFA Spokesperson) – Warned that Japan’s intervention would give China the right to exercise self‑defence [22].
Chinese Mission to the EU – Declared IPAC an “anti‑China organization” and said Hsiao’s address “seriously undermines China’s core interests” [12].
Some Context
IPAC (Inter‑Parliamentary Alliance on China) – An international coalition of legislators formed in 2020 to coordinate responses to Chinese actions that threaten democratic values [7].
Southern Theater Command (STC) – A PLA command responsible for operations in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and the Taiwan Strait; now hosts the new carrier Fujian [51].
CATOBAR (Catapult‑Assisted Take‑off, Arrested Recovery) – A carrier launch system that uses a catapult to accelerate aircraft to take‑off speed; Fujian’s first use of this technology [49].
BIS (U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security) – The U.S. agency that administers export controls; its 2025 suspension of the Affiliates Rule temporarily eased restrictions on certain foreign entities [5][6].
Nexperia – A Dutch semiconductor company that supplies automotive chips; its export controls by China in October 2025 caused global supply‑chain disruptions [56][58][60].
Xi Jinping’s APEC speech frames China as a responsible global leader – On 31 Oct, Xi delivered a speech at the APEC summit in South Korea, emphasizing peace, openness, win‑win cooperation, and inclusive development, while criticizing U.S. protectionism and unilateral trade actions. The speech was used to portray the PRC as a reliable trading partner and to subtly undermine U.S. influence in the region.[1][2]
U.S. and Philippines establish a joint Task Force – On 31 Oct, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced the creation of “Task Force Philippines,” a joint initiative to enhance interoperability and combat readiness between U.S. and Philippine forces, with the goal of protecting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said the effort would counter increasing PRC confrontations. [9][10][11]
PRC conditions Taiwan’s participation in 2026 APEC – The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through spokesperson Mao Ning, announced that Taiwan must adhere to the One‑China Principle to attend the 2026 APEC summit in Shenzhen, a requirement Taiwan does not recognize. Taiwanese Foreign Affairs Minister Lin Chia‑lung criticized the PRC for violating its earlier commitment to Taiwan’s equal participation. [6][7][8]
Taiwan’s ADIZ incursions and CCG patrols decline in October – Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported 222 PLA sorties into the Taiwan ADIZ in October, the lowest since December 2024, while the China Coast Guard conducted at least two incursions into Pratas Island’s contiguous zone and maintained a four‑per‑month patrol pattern around Kinmen, though no Kinmen incursions were reported in October. These activities reflect ongoing PRC efforts to erode Taiwan’s maritime control. [17][19][22][24][25][26]
U.S. and PRC discuss reopening military‑to‑military communication – On 30‑31 Oct, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hegseth met with PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, calling for channels to de‑conflict and de‑escalate potential problems. The PRC, which severed such communication after Pelosi’s 2022 Taiwan visit, reiterated its stance on Taiwan reunification and urged the U.S. to curb its rhetoric. [33][34][35]
PRC pressures UK university research and ships missile components to Iran – The PRC pressured Sheffield Hallam University to halt Uyghur forced‑labor research, citing “disinformation” claims, and threatened staff safety, leading to a temporary shutdown of the research centre. Separately, the PRC shipped 2,000 t of sodium perchlorate to Iran in late September, a key precursor for missile propellant, after U.N. sanctions were re‑imposed. [60][61][62][63][64][65][66][69][70][71]
Who Said What
Xi Jinping – Delivered the APEC speech, framing China as a responsible leader and criticizing U.S. trade policies.
Scott Bessent – U.S. Treasury Secretary who attended the APEC summit in place of President Trump.
Pete Hegseth – U.S. Secretary of Defense who announced the Task Force Philippines and called for U.S.–PRC military communication.
Mao Ning – PRC MFA spokesperson who announced Taiwan’s One‑China requirement for APEC participation.
Dong Jun – PRC Defense Minister who met with Hegseth to discuss military‑to‑military channels.
Laura Murphy – Professor at Sheffield Hallam University whose research on Uyghur forced labor was halted under PRC pressure.
Mohammad Ali Jafari – Former IRGC commander who highlighted Iran’s missile program as its main deterrence.
Some Context
APEC (Asia‑Pacific Economic Cooperation) – An annual forum of 21 Pacific Rim economies that discusses trade, investment, and economic issues.
ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) – A region where a country monitors aircraft for security purposes; incursions by foreign aircraft are viewed as potential threats.
CCG (China Coast Guard) – The maritime law‑enforcement arm of the PRC, tasked with enforcing China’s maritime claims and conducting patrols.
Task Force Philippines – A U.S.‑Philippine joint initiative aimed at improving military interoperability and readiness in the Indo‑Pacific.
Sodium perchlorate – A chemical precursor used to produce ammonium perchlorate, the main component of solid rocket propellant.
PRC suspends rare‑earth export controls for one year – On 30 Oct, the PRC Ministry of Commerce announced a one‑year suspension of the export controls it imposed on 9 Oct, a move agreed with the US during the Trump‑Xi meeting at APEC [1].
PRC investigates Taiwanese legislator Puma Shen for separatism – The Chongqing Public Security Bureau opened a criminal case against DPP member Shen on 28 Oct for allegedly forming a “Taiwan Independence separatist organization,” a charge the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office has repeatedly used to target opposition figures [15].
Taiwan plans unmanned‑systems brigades for each combat zone – Defense Minister Wellington Koo announced that the Ministry of National Defense will train and equip a separate unmanned‑systems brigade in each of Taiwan’s five combat zones, mirroring Ukraine’s “Unmanned Systems Forces” [28].
Xinhua promotes “Patriots Governing Taiwan” model – Two Xinhua commentaries published on 26–27 Oct argued that Taiwan should be governed by “patriots” with high autonomy, a shift away from the “one‑country, two‑systems” framework [39].
Rare‑earth suspension is a tactical de‑escalation, not a strategic shift – Analysts note that the PRC’s temporary lift of controls is a short‑term measure to ease tensions while the country maintains tight control over strategic minerals to curb US technological progress [4][6].
PRC retains 70 % of global rare‑earth mining and imports – As of 2024, the PRC accounts for roughly 70 % of worldwide rare‑earth production and 70 % of US imports, underscoring its continued leverage over critical‑mineral supply chains [4].
Who Said What
PRC Commerce spokesperson – “The PRC will place a one‑year suspension on the rare‑earth export controls enacted on 9 Oct.” [1]
PRC TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua – Praised the Chongqing investigation of Shen as “just and necessary” to oppose Taiwan independence separatism. [19]
Taiwan Defense Minister Wellington Koo – Stated that each combat zone will receive an unmanned‑systems brigade tailored to its tactical needs. [28]
Xinhua editor – Declared that “Patriots governing Taiwan with a high degree of autonomy” would be implemented after unification. [43]
Some Context
Rare‑earth elements – Critical minerals used in electronics, batteries, and defense systems; 70 % of global supply is controlled by China.
Separatism – In PRC law, the crime of advocating Taiwan’s independence; carries severe penalties, including life imprisonment or death.
Unmanned‑systems brigade – A military formation dedicated to operating drones and other unmanned vehicles, designed to increase operational reach and reduce manpower.
Patriots Governing Taiwan – A policy phrase adopted by the PRC to suggest that only those loyal to Beijing should govern Taiwan, implying limited autonomy.
China–Taiwan relations – A complex political and security situation where the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan while the island maintains its own government and international relations.
✦ Xi Jinping expands PLA purges – On Oct 17 the Ministry of National Defense announced the expulsion of nine senior generals, including the CMC vice‑chairman, and referred them to military procuratorates for criminal prosecution, citing serious disciplinary violations [1][2].
✦ Fujian clique largely removed – The purged generals had long served in Taiwan‑focused units such as the 31st/73rd Group Army and the Eastern Theater Command, effectively erasing the “Fujian clique” that had been a core of Xi’s personal network [6][7][8].
✦ Taiwan invests in domestic drone industry – The Executive Yuan approved a 44.2 bn NTD (≈US 1.4 bn) plan to produce 100 k drones over six years, with 48 750 earmarked for the Ministry of National Defense, aiming to boost asymmetric defense capabilities [21][22].
✦ Legislative Yuan passes war‑readiness budget – On Oct 17 the LY approved a 107 bn NTD (≈US 3.4 bn) special budget for fuel, ammunition, water, and communications resilience, signed into law by President Lai Ching‑te on Oct 23 [34][35][36].
✦ Delay in F‑16V delivery raises doubts – Defense Minister Wellington Koo warned on Oct 21 that the 66 F‑16V jets purchased in 2020 may not arrive by 2026, citing logistical delays that could affect Taiwan’s deterrence posture [45][46][47].
✦ PRC sanctions on Hanwha Ocean subsidiaries – On Oct 14 the Ministry of Commerce imposed sanctions on five U.S.‑based subsidiaries of South Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean, citing alleged support for a U.S. port‑fee program and retaliating against U.S.–Korea shipbuilding cooperation [82][83][84].
Who Said What
Deputy Minister Ho Chin‑tsang (Taiwan) said the drone‑investment plan would fund R&D and position Taiwan as a “non‑red” drone supplier, highlighting the country’s push for self‑sufficiency in defense technology [28].
Rupert Hammond‑Chambers (U.S.‑Taiwan Business Council) stated on Oct 20 that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan could surge if the special budget for asymmetric warfare passes the Legislative Yuan, underscoring the link between U.S. aid and Taiwan’s defense spending [31].
Defense Minister Wellington Koo expressed on Oct 21 that the F‑16V delivery schedule is uncertain, noting that delays could erode confidence in U.S. support and affect Taiwan’s military readiness [45].
Some Context
Fujian clique – A network of PLA officers who rose through the Fujian province’s military structures, many of whom were close to Xi Jinping during his early career; the clique’s influence has been curtailed by recent purges.
Central Military Commission (CMC) – The highest military governing body in China, chaired by Xi Jinping; its vice‑chairmen and senior officials oversee the PLA’s strategic direction.
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – China’s unified armed forces, comprising ground, navy, air force, rocket force, and people’s armed police units.
Chairman Responsibility System – A governance framework introduced in 2014 that places ultimate authority over the PLA in the hands of the CMC chairman, intended to prevent power grabs by senior officers.
PLA Daily – The official newspaper of the PLA, used to disseminate policy directives and ideological messaging to military personnel.
PRC fiber‑optic drone component exports surge – In May–August 2025 the PRC exported 119 k, 130 k, and 328 k miles of fiber‑optic cable to Russia, up from 7 k miles in March 2025, indicating a focused effort to supply Russia’s drone industry [1].
Rare‑earth export controls expanded – On 9 Oct 2025 the PRC Commerce Ministry added holmium, europium, ytterbium, thulium, and erbium to its export‑control list, the first time it regulated critical‑mineral processing technology ahead of the APEC summit [15].
KMT chairperson election won by Cheng Li‑wun – On 18 Oct 2025 Cheng Li‑wun secured 50.15 % of the vote, defeating establishment favorite Hau Lung‑bin, and pledged to promote a shared “Chinese” identity for Taiwanese people [37].
South Korea adopts two‑state framework – On 14 Oct 2025 Unification Minister Chung Dong‑young announced that the Lee Jae‑myung administration will pursue a two‑state solution for inter‑Korean relations, moving away from the long‑standing unification policy [29].
Taiwan’s defense strategy shifts to asymmetric and T‑Dome – The 9 Oct National Defense Report outlined a “Resilient Defense and Multi‑Domain Deterrence” plan, prioritizing drones, mobile batteries, and a multi‑layered T‑Dome air‑defence system [58].
PRC issues reward notices for Taiwanese officers – On 10 Oct 2025 the PRC Ministry of State Security announced a bounty for three Taiwanese military‑intelligence officers accused of “secessionist” propaganda, labeling it a cognitive‑warfare tactic [81].
Who Said What
Cheng Li‑wun – “All Taiwanese citizens are Chinese, according to the constitution, and I will make every Taiwanese proud to call themselves Chinese.” (KMT chairperson, 8 Oct 2025)
Chung Dong‑young – “Adopting a two‑state solution will create an opportunity for peace based on the END initiative.” (Unification Minister, 14 Oct 2025)
Wellington Koo – “The T‑Dome will feature closer sensor‑to‑shooter integration, allowing Taiwan’s air defenses to achieve higher success rates.” (Defense Minister, 10 Oct 2025)
PRC Ministry of State Security – “The individuals listed have conducted propaganda and sabotage, violating the Anti‑Secession Law.” (Official statement, 10 Oct 2025)
Some Context
Fiber‑optic drone – A UAV that uses fiber‑optic cables for data transmission, making it resistant to electronic jamming.
Rare earths – A group of 17 metallic elements critical for high‑tech manufacturing; China supplies the majority of global demand.
T‑Dome – Taiwan’s proposed multi‑layered air‑defence system integrating anti‑air, anti‑missile, and anti‑drone capabilities.
Asymmetric defense – A strategy that emphasizes small, mobile, low‑cost systems to offset a larger adversary’s conventional superiority.
Reward notice – A public bounty issued by the PRC to incentivize the capture of individuals deemed to threaten national security.
