Nov 23, 2025 – Unification Minister Lee Jae‑yeong reiterates that South Korea’s ultimate aim is reunification with the North, emphasizing a peaceful, gradual approach and warning that accidental border clashes must be avoided [11].

Nov 24, 2025 – North Korea enacts an urban‑development law to improve housing, infrastructure and public services, signalling a domestic focus on economic modernization [11].

Nov 26, 2025 – Lee Jae‑yeong again stresses a peaceful, step‑by‑step policy toward the North, urging dialogue and confidence‑building while cautioning against unintended incidents [11].

Nov 27, 2025 – Kim Jong‑un visits a greenhouse farm in Sinuiju, showcasing leadership involvement in agricultural projects near the Chinese border [11].

Nov 28, 2025 – Joint South Korea‑U.S. drills (including Silent Shark anti‑submarine exercises and forward‑deployed F‑16s) are conducted to deter North Korea; U.S. Forces Korea calls the drills strictly defensive, while Pyongyang condemns them as provocative “war rehearsals” [11, 12].

Nov 28, 2025 – Commercial satellite imagery confirms ongoing modernization and expansion of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, underscoring North Korea’s continued weapons development [12].

Dec 7, 2025 – National Security Adviser Wi Sung‑lac states Seoul is not using the Korea‑U.S. drills as a bargaining chip to restart inter‑Korean talks, noting limited progress in dialogue and reaffirming President Lee Jae‑Myung’s view that large‑scale drills may be reduced only under stable peace conditions [9, 10].

Dec 8, 2025 – The Unification Ministry says any adjustment to the joint exercises can be discussed only if “necessary conditions and a suitable environment” arise, with spokesperson Yoon Min‑ho emphasizing no definitive policy shift yet [8].

Dec 10, 2025 – Unification Minister Chung Dong‑young declares that keeping the option to modify or postpone the drills open is a strategic tool to revive stalled talks with Pyongyang, framing the exercises as a means to peace rather than an end in themselves [6].

Dec 11, 2025 – Chung Dong‑young reiterates that a flexible stance on drill size could help reopen dialogue, while National Security Adviser Wi Sung‑lac again denies any current plan to change the exercises, highlighting internal disagreement within the security council [5].

Dec 12, 2025 – South Korea confirms it will not leverage the joint drills to restart negotiations; meanwhile, Seoul and Washington prepare to launch a regular consultative meeting on North Korea policy as early as the following week, aiming to coordinate diplomatic efforts [4].

Dec 15, 2025 – U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Xavier Brunson stresses that the joint drills are the cornerstone of readiness and deterrence, citing past suspensions of “Team Spirit” in 1992, 1994 and a 2018 delay as ineffective in compelling North Korean concessions; Acting U.S. Ambassador Kevin Kim opposes unilateral changes to the exercises [7].

Jan 7, 2026 – Defense Minister Ahn Gyu‑back affirms the annual Korea‑U.S. drills will proceed as planned, calling them a “lifeline for soldiers,” while leaving open the possibility of adjustments if U.S.–North Korea talks bear fruit; he also outlines a roadmap to field a nuclear‑powered submarine by the mid‑2030s and to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) to Seoul by 2030, with Full Operational Capability verification expected by year‑end [3].

Jan 20, 2026 – A coalition of 357 progressive civic and religious groups and 13 lawmakers, led by Rep. Lee In‑young, urges the suspension of the regular Korea‑U.S. drills, calling for a halt to border hostilities and a redefinition of air, sea and land buffer zones in line with the 2018 inter‑Korean tensions‑reduction pact [2].

Feb 22, 2026 – South Korea and the United States delay announcing the spring Freedom Shield drill date after the U.S. objects to Seoul’s proposal to scale back on‑field training; Seoul frames the scaling‑back as a diplomatic overture to Pyongyang, while both sides agree to set a new announcement date later in February or early March and confirm that the March exercise will proceed normally, focusing on transferring wartime operational control to South Korean forces [1].