2014 – Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reinterprets Article 9 to permit collective self‑defence, laying the legal groundwork for Japan’s later shift toward a normalised military and enabling future security‑document revisions[7].

2022 – Japan’s “Free and Open Indo‑Pacific” security strategy identifies China as the nation’s greatest strategic challenge and calls for a more offensive role for Japanese forces under the U.S. alliance, setting the policy direction that Takaichi later expands[7].

Oct 2025 – Sanae Takaichi wins the Liberal Democratic Party leadership race and is sworn in as Japan’s first female prime minister, positioning her to steer a major defence and constitutional agenda[1].

Nov 2025 – Takaichi publicly states that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would constitute a “survival‑threatening situation” for Japan and could justify a joint intervention with U.S. forces, signalling a break from Japan’s post‑war pacifist restraint[4].

Dec 17 2025 – North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun condemns Japan’s plan to review the three non‑nuclear principles, accusing Tokyo of re‑arming and threatening regional peace[12].

Dec 22 2025 – China’s Foreign Ministry warns that Japan’s discussion of a nuclear deterrent “risks regional stability,” citing recent missile‑deployment plans near Taiwan and framing Tokyo as a revanchist power[4].

Dec 31 2025 – A senior Japanese cabinet adviser tells reporters it is “time to begin discussions about acquiring a nuclear deterrent,” linking the idea to a possible Chinese blockade of Taiwan and to revisiting the Three Non‑Nuclear Principles[3].

Dec 31 2025 – Japan doubles its defence budget, approving a record 9 trillion‑yen plan to boost strike‑back capability, cruise‑missile arsenals and unmanned systems as part of a broader push to become self‑reliant amid China’s growing naval activity[7].

Jan 2 2026 – President Donald Trump phones Prime Minister Takaichi and invites her to the United States, proposing a spring visit that could coincide with Washington’s cherry‑blossom festival[6][9].

Jan 6 2026 – North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun denounces Japan’s 9.04 trillion‑yen defence budget as a step toward “reinvasion plotting” and a rewrite of the pacifist constitution, portraying the plan as aggressive expansion[11].

Jan 8 2026 – China imposes vague dual‑use export restrictions on Japan and launches a probe into a 31 % price drop in Japanese‑supplied chip‑gas, while Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning publicly condemns Takaichi for “interfering in China’s internal affairs” after her November Taiwan remarks[5].

Jan 11 2026 – North Korea’s KCNA decries Japan’s effort to draft three new national security documents, calling the move a “craze for neo‑militarism” that will lead to Japan’s self‑destruction[10].

Feb 6 2026 – Trump posts on Truth Social that Takaichi is “strong, powerful, and wise” and pledges U.S. support ahead of the snap election, underscoring the endorsement as a signal to China[1].

Feb 8 2026 – A snap election yields the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its Japan Innovation Party partner more than 75 % of lower‑house seats, giving Takaichi a super‑majority to pursue security‑document amendments and defence reforms[2].

Feb 14 2026 – At the Munich Security Conference, Chinese diplomat Wang Yi accuses Japan of trying to “revive militarism,” reflecting Beijing’s heightened anger over Tokyo’s defence posture and Taiwan statements[8].

Feb 18 2026 – Japan’s lower house formally reappoints Sanae Takaichi as prime minister, confirming her historic status as the first female premier and cementing the LDP’s two‑thirds parliamentary majority[8].

Feb 20 2026 – Takaichi announces a defence‑budget increase to roughly 2 % of GDP—about double the 2022 level—and pledges to review the three core security documents, loosen arms‑export rules and create a ministerial‑level intelligence agency, marking the largest post‑war military buildup[2].

Mar 19 2026 (planned) – Trump schedules a White House meeting with Prime Minister Takaichi, indicating ongoing U.S.–Japan collaboration on security and economic fronts and reinforcing the alliance ahead of regional tensions[1].

Spring 2026 (planned) – Takaichi’s anticipated visit to the United States is coordinated to occur in spring, potentially aligning with the cherry‑blossom festival and serving as a platform to deepen the Japan‑U.S. alliance and discuss the “Free and Open Indo‑Pacific” agenda[6][9].