2025 – Taiwan supplies roughly 60 % of global semiconductor output and over 90 % of cutting‑edge AI nodes, making the island a linchpin of worldwide high‑tech supply chains[3].

Jan 15, 2026 – The United States and Taiwan sign a reciprocal trade and investment pact that cuts U.S. tariffs on Taiwanese goods to 15 % (matching Japan, South Korea and the EU), secures at least $250 billion in Taiwanese direct investments and an equal amount in credit guarantees, and frames the deal as a step toward U.S. self‑sufficiency, with Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick telling CNBC the country will “bring chip production home”[14][15][1]; Taiwan pledges up to $250 billion in financing to back the projects[1]; Beijing denounces the agreement as “economic plunder”[4]; TSMC pledges about $165 billion, accelerates construction of its Arizona fab (opened 2024 with $40 billion in U.S. subsidies), and expands its U.S. plant cluster[4][1].

Jan 15, 2026 – South Korea convenes an emergency meeting chaired by Industry Minister Kim Jung‑kwan to map a response to Washington’s 25 % AI‑chip tariff and broader critical‑mineral duties, vows “all‑out” efforts to mitigate impact, and extends Trade Minister Yeo Han‑koo’s U.S. stay to coordinate with U.S. officials[16].

Jan 16, 2026 – The U.S.–Taiwan chip agreement caps sector‑specific tariffs at 15 %, exempts aircraft components and generic pharmaceuticals, and grants Taiwanese firms duty‑free import quotas of up to 2.5 × planned capacity during construction and 1.5 × after completion while establishing world‑class industrial parks in the United States[3]; Beijing’s foreign ministry publicly opposes any sovereign‑connotation agreement with Taiwan[3]; doubts about U.S. reliability rise in Taipei after former President Trump’s accusations of Taiwanese “chip theft” and demands for “protection money”[3]; a senior U.S. official announces that Washington will negotiate “separate” semiconductor tariff deals with each country rather than a universal standard[11][12][13].

Jan 17, 2026 – President Trump signs a proclamation imposing a 25 % tariff on certain AI semiconductors imported into the United States and re‑exported abroad, and signals that the U.S. will pursue country‑by‑country chip‑tariff agreements, using the Taiwan pact as a template[10][11]; South Korea’s top trade envoy, after a six‑day U.S. visit, says the AI‑chip measure has limited impact on Korean memory chips but warns Washington could unveil a “second‑stage” tariff[10].

Jan 18, 2026 – South Korea’s government announces it will seek “no‑less‑favorable” treatment in U.S. chip‑tariff talks, studies the U.S.–Taiwan pact as a benchmark, and prepares briefings from the trade ministry and domestic chipmakers for upcoming negotiations[7]; at a Micron groundbreaking, Commerce Secretary Lutnick reiterates the “pay 100 % tariff or build in America” ultimatum, linking tariff relief to U.S. production and heightening pressure on Korean exporters[8]; the Taiwan deal’s tariff‑free quota becomes a reference point, prompting Korean officials to note that any concession must not be less favorable than Taiwan’s, which dominates U.S. semiconductor trade volumes[8]; Samsung and SK hynix collectively announce about $41 billion of U.S. investments, giving Washington leverage for further demands[8]; semiconductors account for roughly 30 % of Korea’s U.S. exports, making the sector Korea’s second‑largest export to the United States[8].

Jan 19, 2026 – Commerce Secretary Lutnick warns that memory‑chip makers that do not invest in the United States face tariffs up to 100 %, stating the goal is to relocate “at least 40 % of Taiwan’s chip supply and production” to the U.S.[5]; the U.S. similarly threatens up to 100 % duties on non‑investing chipmakers, targeting Samsung and SK hynix as potential subjects[6]; Washington postpones Korea’s July‑negotiated tariff relief and ties Korean imports to a $350 billion investment pledge, mirroring the Taiwan model that includes $250 billion in credit guarantees[5]; analysts caution that aggressive tariff leverage could strain the Korea‑U.S. alliance and disrupt global supply chains[5].

Feb 20, 2026 – U.S. Department of Commerce data show Taiwan’s shipments to the United States total $24.7 billion in December, overtaking China’s $21.1 billion for the first time in decades, while the U.S. goods‑trade deficit widens to $146.8 billion with Taiwan and $202.1 billion with China, reflecting the impact of the new 15 % tariff cap and the $250 billion investment pledge[2]; Taiwan’s 2025 economy grows 8.63 % and its GDP per‑capita surpasses Japan and South Korea, fueling stock‑market highs and broader prosperity[2]; President Trump announces a planned April visit to Beijing at Xi Jinping’s invitation, building on recent trade concessions discussed in October in South Korea[2].

Future (2026‑2027) – The United States signals that any future semiconductor tariff agreements will be negotiated on a country‑by‑country basis, with the Taiwan pact serving as a template for potential deals with other exporters, while retaining the option to impose a “second‑stage” AI‑chip tariff if negotiations stall[10][11]; South Korea pledges to continue consultations with Washington under the “no‑less‑favorable” principle and to seek balanced concessions that protect its memory‑chip sector while meeting U.S. investment demands[7][8].