Europe Questions U.S. Nuclear Leadership as Trump Targets Greenland, New START Ends
Updated (2 articles)
Trump’s Greenland Demand Undermines U.S. Credibility in NATO President Donald Trump’s public push to acquire Denmark’s Greenland has fractured European trust in the United States as NATO’s primary security guarantor, prompting allies to question the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella [1]. The dispute highlights a shift from the post‑World War II expectation that the United States would act as primus inter pares within the alliance [1]. European leaders now view the U.S. stance as a potential breach of collective defense commitments [1].
NATO’s Nuclear Shield Faces Credibility Crisis After New START Expiry The bilateral New START treaty between the United States and Russia expired on February 5, 2026, removing the last major arms‑control framework limiting each side’s strategic arsenals [1]. Both nations retain over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while China adds roughly 100 warheads annually, reaching about 600, and the United Kingdom has reversed a 2006 cut to maintain 225 warheads [1]. This arms buildup fuels concerns that NATO’s deterrence model, historically anchored by U.S. nuclear guarantees, is losing its strategic certainty [1].
European Leaders Explore Alternative Security Arrangements In response to waning U.S. confidence, EU officials are debating tighter defence cooperation, contributions to the SAFE fund, and the possibility of the United Kingdom or France extending a “nuclear umbrella” over European members [1]. Proposals aim to create a more autonomous security architecture that could bypass reliance on American nuclear commitments [1]. The debate reflects a broader reassessment of NATO’s role in European defence policy [1].
Ukraine’s Conventional Resistance Highlights Limits of Nuclear Threats Despite repeated nuclear warnings from Russian President Vladimir Putin before and after the 2022 invasion, Ukraine has continued to resist using conventional forces supported by international aid [1]. The Ukrainian experience demonstrates that robust non‑nuclear responses can blunt the coercive effect of nuclear threats [1]. This outcome challenges the assumption that nuclear deterrence alone can guarantee security for non‑nuclear states [1].
Timeline
1956 – The United States “uses heavy diplomatic and economic leverage to halt the operation” in the Suez Crisis, forcing Britain, France and Israel to withdraw and sparking street protests that strain transatlantic ties [1].
1980s – Russia deploys SS‑20 missiles, prompting NATO to station U.S. Pershing missiles in Europe; massive anti‑nuclear demonstrations erupt across European capitals, highlighting deep public anxiety over a renewed arms race [1].
2003 – The United States invades Iraq without broad European backing, and U.S. officials label France and Germany as “less reliable” while praising Eastern European states as more aligned, deepening the “Old Europe/New Europe” split [1].
2024 – President Trump returns to the White House, “unsettles Ukraine aid and European security” by signaling a softer stance toward Russia and hinting at reduced assistance to Kyiv, prompting European leaders to warn of dependence on U.S. support [1].
2025 – The Trump administration threatens steep tariffs on EU goods, then negotiates a framework that caps most tariffs at 15 percent, illustrating a tense but pragmatic economic stance between Washington and Europe [1].
2025 – Trump publicly demands the acquisition of Denmark’s Greenland, a move that “erodes European confidence in the United States as a reliable NATO ally” and revives long‑standing transatlantic rifts [2].
Feb 4, 2026 – Analysts note that “Trust in the U.S. as NATO’s guarantor is broken by Trump’s Greenland push,” raising doubts about the alliance’s nuclear cohesion and prompting calls for alternative security arrangements [2].
Feb 5, 2026 – The New START treaty between the United States and Russia expires, removing the last major arms‑control constraint and heightening fears of a return to Cold‑War‑style nuclear deterrence [2].
2023‑2026 – China adds roughly 100 nuclear warheads per year, reaching about 600 by 2026, while the United Kingdom reverses a 2006 cut to hold 225 warheads, and both the United States and Russia each retain over 5,000 warheads, reshaping global nuclear balance [2].
2026 – European leaders advance proposals for tighter EU defence cooperation, participation in the SAFE fund, and a possible “nuclear umbrella” extended by the UK or France, signaling a potential shift away from exclusive U.S. nuclear protection [2].