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U.S. Strategy Elevates First Island Chain, Urges Korean Submarines, Skips North Korea

Updated (5 articles)

Strategy Release and Core Priorities The White House unveiled a 33‑page National Security Strategy on Dec 5 2025, centering U.S. Indo‑Pacific policy on defending the First Island Chain and reasserting a Trump‑style Monroe Doctrine while omitting any reference to North Korean denuclearization [1][2][3][4][5].

Burden‑Sharing Demands on Seoul and Tokyo The document explicitly calls on South Korea and Japan to increase defense budgets, praising Seoul’s pledge to raise spending to 3.5 % of GDP and urging Tokyo to match the effort, signaling a shift toward greater allied cost‑sharing for regional security [1][2][3][4][5].

Approval of Nuclear‑Powered Submarines for South Korea President Trump’s authorization for South Korea to build nuclear‑powered submarines is highlighted as a key deterrence contribution, described as a concrete example of the new collective defense framework [1][3][4].

Implications for U.S. Forces in Korea The strategy notes a “hardening and strengthening” of the U.S. presence in the Western Pacific and hints at a possible review of the 28,500‑strong U.S. Forces Korea, though no specific reduction plan is detailed [1][2][4].

Strategic Shift Away From North Korean Denuclearization By excluding any mention of a denuclearization goal, the NSS departs from prior administrations and raises questions about future U.S. diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang [1][2][3][4][5].

Sources

Timeline

Early 2025 – President Trump authorizes South Korea to build nuclear‑powered submarines, a move officials describe as “a clear example of cooperation to strengthen allies’ conventional deterrence against regional threats”[3]. This decision signals a shift toward deeper security integration with Seoul and lays groundwork for the First Island Chain strategy later that year.

Dec 5 2025 – The White House publishes a 33‑page National Security Strategy (NSS), marking the first major U.S. strategic document released under the Trump administration since 2024[1]. The NSS reasserts an “America First” posture and sets the agenda for U.S. defense policy through 2026.

Dec 5 2025 – The NSS prioritizes defense of the “First Island Chain,” calling on South Korea and Japan to “build capabilities to defend the First Island Chain,” a maritime perimeter that includes Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines[1][4]. Emphasizing this chain signals a strategic pivot toward countering China’s maritime expansion.

Dec 5 2025 – The strategy urges Seoul and Tokyo to raise defense spending, explicitly demanding that “South Korea and Japan increase defense budgets, especially for new deterrence capabilities”[1][5]. The document praises South Korea’s pledge to lift spending to 3.5 % of GDP, highlighting it as the first non‑NATO ally to meet that benchmark[5].

Dec 5 2025 – The NSS omits any reference to North Korean denuclearization, stating that “the document makes no reference to nuclear non‑proliferation or the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” a departure from previous administrations that linked U.S. strategy to Pyongyang’s nuclear program[1][2]. This omission raises questions about future U.S. diplomatic leverage over North Korea.

Dec 5 2025 – The strategy highlights Trump’s approval of South Korean nuclear‑powered submarines as a cornerstone of collective deterrence, noting that “Trump approved South Korea’s construction of nuclear‑powered submarines”[1]. By foregrounding this program, the NSS underscores a shift from U.S.‑centric deterrence to allied self‑reliance.

Dec 5 2025 – The NSS introduces a “Trump Corollary” to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, declaring that the United States will “enforce a Trump‑style isolationist doctrine in the Western Hemisphere while hardening the Pacific presence”[2][5]. This historical reference frames the new strategy as a modernized version of America’s long‑standing hemispheric policy.

Dec 5 2025 – The document signals a potential review of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) levels, noting a plan to “harden and strengthen” the U.S. presence in the Western Pacific and hinting at a possible adjustment of the 28,500‑strong USFK contingent[1][4]. The prospect of force‑level changes reflects the NSS’s broader aim to redistribute burden‑sharing among allies.