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Assassination Attempt on GRU Deputy Head Alekseyev Highlights Russia’s Strained 2026 Offensive Plans

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Kremlin Rejects Western Guarantees, Cites Istanbul Draft Lavrov reiterated on Feb 6 that Russia will not accept any Western‑provided security guarantees for Ukraine, insisting instead on the 2022 Istanbul draft that makes Russia a neutral guarantor, grants it veto power over future mechanisms, and forces Ukraine into neutrality with strict force limits [1]. He framed the draft as the only viable framework for ending the conflict, rejecting all alternative diplomatic proposals [1].

Limited Strategic Reserves Planned for Summer 2026 Offensive Ukrainian analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on Feb 5 that Russian forces are assembling limited strategic reserves for a possible offensive as early as late April 2026 [1]. The buildup focuses on the Slovyansk‑Kramatorsk and Orikhiv‑Zaporizhzhia axes, but Moscow struggles to secure adequate starting positions [1]. Command may have to decide whether to deploy these reserves now or conserve them for later phases [1].

Russian Advances Stall on Key Fronts Despite strikes on Ukrainian supply lines and a brief battlefield‑air‑interdiction campaign, Russian units have only managed limited infiltrations around Lyman, Kostyantynivka and Hulyaipole [1]. They remain roughly 23 km from Slovyansk and 35 km from Orikhiv, with Ukrainian counter‑offensives diverting Russian reserves [1]. Small‑group assaults have failed to capture major towns, indicating a slowdown in momentum [1].

Hulyaipole Captured, Further Gains Unlikely Geolocated footage confirms Russian forces holding Hulyaipole after a three‑month fight, having seized it by Dec 27 2025 [1]. The capture relied on foggy weather that hampered Ukrainian drones, and winter conditions now limit infantry operations [1]. Russia has committed elements of three combined‑arms armies to the area while deprioritizing other sectors, suggesting no swift push beyond the town [1].

Starlink Block Reduces Russian Frontline Assaults Ukrainian General Staff sources reported that SpaceX’s shutdown of unregistered Starlink terminals forced Russian troops to cut back on assaults and FPV‑drone attacks [1]. Ukrainian units no longer need to target Russian terminals, and milbloggers note operational difficulties and attempts to find alternatives [1]. The Joint Forces Task Force assessed the impact as greater on Russian forces than on Ukrainian ones [1].

Assassination Attempt Targets GRU Deputy Head Alekseyev Russia’s Investigative Committee said unknown shooters fired three rounds at GRU deputy head Vladimir Alekseyev near his Moscow home on Feb 6, leaving him hospitalized in critical condition [1]. Alekseyev, linked to the Redut PMC and Wagner Group, played a key role in the 2022 invasion and earlier negotiations [1]. Former ultranationalist Igor Girkin previously accused him of creating Wagner, adding a political dimension to the attack [1].

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Timeline

2022 – Istanbul Draft (Security Protocol) – The draft protocol, negotiated after Russia’s February 2022 invasion, proposes Russia as a neutral guarantor, gives it veto power over future response mechanisms, forces Ukraine into neutrality and imposes strict force limits, and becomes the reference point for Moscow’s later diplomatic refusals [1].

Mid‑November 2025 – Russian breakthrough near Hulyaipole – The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces achieves a 17‑km penetration northeast of Hulyaipole, concentrating forces comparable to those in the Pokrovsk‑Dobropillya sector, signaling a focused push on the southern front [3].

Dec 2 2025 – US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s assessment – Rubio states that Putin’s belief Russia can outlast the West in a war of attrition is “unrealistic,” noting Russia now holds less territory than in early 2022 and Ukraine has reclaimed over 50 % of the land seized [3].

Dec 3 2025 – Kremlin’s refusal to discuss US‑Russia talks – Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declares that any negotiations with the United States are confidential and will not be publicly debated, arguing private talks are more effective [3].

Dec 3 2025 – Odesa narrative revived – Duma Deputy Dmitry Pevtsov claims “Odesa City is a Russian city” and asserts that Russia will resolve the war militarily so Russians can return to their “ancestral lands” [3].

Dec 4 2025 – Putin’s interview in India reiterates war aims – Putin declares that Russia will end the conflict only when it secures protection of ethnic Russians, the Russian language, the Orthodox Church, and a ban on NATO expansion, rejecting the U.S. peace proposal as a continuation of the 2022 Istanbul agreement [2].

Dec 4 2025 – Kremlin baseline demands reaffirmed – Leonid Slutsky and other State Duma members repeat that Russia will not alter its core demands: prohibiting Ukrainian NATO membership, enforcing Ukrainian demilitarisation, and “denazifying” the government, insisting these goals can be achieved on the battlefield [2].

Dec 4 2025 – Zhuravlev frames Odesa/Mykolaiv withdrawals as concessions – Alexei Zhuravlev warns that Russia could launch an offensive on Odesa and Mykolaiv if Ukraine does not comply, portraying any future Russian withdrawal from those cities as a “concession” despite current inability to seize them by land or sea [2].

Dec 4 2025 – No encirclement of Myrnohrad – Ukrainian sources and the Institute for the Study of War find no evidence that Russian troops have surrounded Myrnohrad; Ukrainian supply lines remain intact and rotations continue [2].

Dec 4 2025 – Limited Russian infiltrations in eastern Ukraine – Russian units conduct infiltration operations and make marginal gains in Pokrovsk, Velykyi Burluk and Kupyansk sectors, but fail to secure decisive territorial control as Ukrainian forces hold key positions and launch counter‑attacks [2].

Dec 4 2025 – Russian cognitive‑warfare targeting Chernihiv – Russian media and social‑media posts spread narratives of an imminent offensive on Chernihiv to pressure Ukraine, while Ukrainian officials counter that Russia lacks the manpower and materiel for such an operation [2].

Dec 27 2025 – Capture of Hulyaipole – After a three‑month battle, Russian forces seize Hulyaipole, using foggy weather to blunt Ukrainian drone surveillance; winter conditions then limit infantry operations, and Moscow commits elements of three combined‑arms armies to hold the town while deprioritising other sectors [1].

Early 2026 – Russian advances stall on Slovyansk‑Kramatorsk and Orikhiv‑Zaporizhzhia fronts – Despite strikes on Ukrainian supply lines and a brief battlefield‑air‑interdiction campaign, Russian units achieve only limited infiltrations around Lyman, Kostyantynivka and Hulyaipole, remaining roughly 23 km from Slovyansk and 35 km from Orikhiv as Ukrainian counter‑offensives divert Russian reserves [1].

Feb 5 2026 – Assessment of Russian strategic reserves for a summer 2026 offensive – Ukrainian analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets reports that Russia prepares limited strategic reserves for a possible offensive as early as late April 2026, focusing on the Slovyansk‑Kramatorsk and Orikhiv‑Zaporizhzhia axes but struggling to secure starting positions and risking a shortage of reserves that forces a choice between using them now or later [1].

Feb 6 2026 – Lavrov rejects Western security guarantees – Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterates that Russia will not accept any Western‑provided security guarantees for Ukraine, insisting instead on the 2022 Istanbul draft that treats Russia as a neutral guarantor, grants it veto power, forces Ukrainian neutrality and severe force limits [1].

Feb 6 2026 – Assassination attempt on GRU deputy head Vladimir Alekseyev – Unknown shooters fire three rounds at Alekseyev near his Moscow home, leaving him hospitalized in critical condition; Alekseyev, linked to volunteer formations, the Redut PMC and the Wagner Group, played a key role in the 2022 invasion and earlier negotiations [1].

Feb 6 2026 – SpaceX’s Starlink block curtails Russian frontline assaults – Ukrainian General Staff sources report that SpaceX’s shutdown of unregistered Starlink terminals forces Russian troops to cut back on assaults and FPV‑drone attacks, while Ukrainian units no longer need to target Russian terminals, creating greater operational difficulties for Moscow’s forces [1].

Late April 2026 (planned) – Potential Russian summer offensive – Analysts anticipate that Russia may launch a limited offensive in late April 2026, targeting the Slovyansk‑Kramatorsk and Orikhiv‑Zaporizhzhia axes, contingent on whether Moscow decides to expend its strained strategic reserves now or preserve them for later [1].

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