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South Korea Boosts Defense Spending; US NDS Elevates Seoul, North Korea Plans New Nuclear Deterrent

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U.S. Strategy Shifts Defense Burden to Seoul The 2026 National Defense Strategy declares South Korea capable of “primary” responsibility for deterring North Korean threats, with the United States offering only “critical but more limited” support [1][2]. The document omits any reference to a denuclearization goal, treating Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal as a permanent challenge [1][12]. It also frames China as the primary strategic concern, casting the Korean Peninsula as a “cork” in the first island chain [2].

South Korea Commits to 3.5% GDP Defense Spending President Lee Jae Myung pledged to raise defense spending to 3.5 % of GDP, a target praised by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby as “clear‑eyed and sage” and evidence of Seoul’s “model ally” status [4][6][8][14]. The pledge aligns with Washington’s burden‑sharing push and is intended to fund projects such as nuclear‑powered submarines and the reclamation of wartime operational control [5][9]. South Korea already spends about 1.4 times North Korea’s entire GDP on defense, underscoring its capacity to meet the new role [1][14].

Joint Talks Focus on Nuclear Submarines and Wartime Control During a Jan 26 meeting, Defense Minister Ahn Gyu‑back and Colby agreed to deepen cooperation on acquiring nuclear‑powered submarines, describing the program as a “landmark” for the alliance [5][7][9][10]. Both sides also discussed Seoul’s goal of regaining wartime operational control (OPCON) to enable a Korea‑led defense of the peninsula [5][7][9]. Colby’s visit included a tour of Camp Humphreys and a lecture at the Sejong Institute, reinforcing the strategic dialogue [6][8].

North Korea Signals New Nuclear Deterrent Plans Kim Jong Un announced that the next Workers’ Party Congress will unveil “next‑stage measures” to strengthen the North’s nuclear war deterrent [3]. The statement, released via KCNA and reported by Yonhap, signals that Pyongyang will continue to develop its nuclear capabilities despite the U.S. strategy’s omission of denuclearization [3][18].

Contrasting U.S. Signals on Extended Deterrence While Colby publicly lauded South Korea as a “model ally,” he also questioned whether any U.S. president would risk American cities for Seoul, calling such guarantees “comforting in peacetime and implausible in war” [2][4]. The NDS does not explicitly reference the U.S. nuclear umbrella, leaving the scope of “critical” support ambiguous [1][15]. Seoul plans to press Washington for clearer assurances on extended deterrence and denuclearization goals [1][12].

Sources

Timeline

Dec 1, 2025 – South Korea urges the United States to begin civil uranium enrichment and spent‑fuel reprocessing talks, and both governments agree to launch sectoral working groups on nuclear energy and nuclear‑powered submarines, with the first meetings slated within three months[27][28].

Dec 3, 2025 – Foreign Minister Cho Hyun delivers video remarks at a Washington forum, stressing that diplomatic engagement with North Korea must accompany deterrence measures and highlighting the Nov 13 joint fact sheet that pledges U.S. support for Seoul’s nuclear‑powered submarine program and a 3.5 % GDP defense‑spending target[24].

Dec 8, 2025 – Former Seoul diplomat Cho Byung‑jae warns that dropping denuclearization language from Korean‑U.S. policy could trigger a regional nuclear domino and undermine the NPT, echoing concerns after the U.S. National Security Strategy omits the term[23].

Dec 10, 2025 – Second Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jina arrives in Washington ahead of the 10th Senior Economic Dialogue, pressing the United States to assign a counterpart and start substantive discussions on civil uranium enrichment and spent‑fuel reprocessing, while noting that submarine issues are not on the agenda[22].

Dec 12, 2025 – Seoul’s National Security Adviser Wi Sung‑lac states that South Korea will not use joint U.S.–ROK drills as leverage in inter‑Korean talks, reinforcing a policy of maintaining current exercise schedules while seeking diplomatic avenues with the North[20].

Dec 12, 2025 – Acting U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Kevin Kim reaffirms the shared goal of complete North Korean denuclearization despite its omission from the new U.S. security strategy, underscoring continued alliance alignment on the issue[21].

Dec 15, 2025 – Wi Sung‑lac announces plans to discuss South Korea’s nuclear‑powered submarine ambitions, uranium enrichment, and spent‑fuel reprocessing with U.S. counterparts in Washington, noting three task forces prepared to advance the agenda[18].

Dec 16, 2025 – Wi Sung‑lac meets U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington to discuss follow‑up measures to the late‑October Lee‑Trump summit, including the pursuit of nuclear‑powered submarines and a possible separate bilateral agreement for uranium enrichment under Section 91, mirroring Australia’s arrangement[17].

Dec 17, 2025 – U.S. and South Korean officials hold talks in Washington on civil uranium enrichment and spent‑fuel reprocessing, building on the joint fact sheet that supports Seoul’s peaceful nuclear‑energy goals and the approved nuclear‑powered submarine program[15].

Dec 17, 2025 – A pro‑Pyongyang newspaper highlights the omission of North Korea from the U.S. National Security Strategy, calling it the most notable aspect and questioning whether the issue will be deprioritized under the Trump administration[16].

Dec 24, 2025 – South Korea conducts its second regular East Sea drill near Dokdo under President Lee Jae‑Myung, following a pattern established since 1986 and twice yearly since 2003, prompting a formal Japanese diplomatic complaint[14].

Dec 24, 2025 – South Korea and the United States agree to pursue a stand‑alone nuclear‑submarine cooperation pact, with working‑level talks expected to start early next year, signaling a dedicated framework beyond broader defense discussions[13].

Dec 24, 2025 – Seoul pushes for wartime operational control (OPCON) handover by 2030, framing the move as a historic turning point in the alliance and linking it to broader autonomy goals amid U.S. pressure for greater burden sharing[12].

Dec 24, 2025 – The 2021 lift of missile‑guideline limits, which allowed South Korea longer‑range missiles, is recalled as a precedent for Seoul’s expanding sovereign defense capabilities[12].

Dec 30, 2025 – First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon‑joo lands in Washington to discuss implementation mechanisms for the joint fact sheet, covering civil uranium enrichment, spent‑fuel reprocessing, and nuclear‑powered submarines, while seeking consultative bodies to advance the commitments[30].

Jan 7, 2026 – Defense Minister Ahn Gyu‑back tells Yonhap that the annual U.S.–ROK joint drills proceed as planned, calling them a “lifeline for soldiers,” yet leaves open the possibility of adjustment if U.S.–North Korea talks produce substantive progress[11].

Jan 7, 2026 – Pentagon officials consider a back‑to‑back trip for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to South Korea and Japan later in the month, with expected agenda items including South Korea’s 3.5 % defense‑spending pledge, OPCON transfer, and nuclear‑submarine plans[10].

Jan 20, 2026 – A coalition of 357 progressive civic and religious groups and 13 lawmakers, joined by over 200 participants, urges the South Korean government to suspend regular U.S.–ROK drills and halt border hostilities, framing the call as a step toward peace and a shift from military pressure to normalization[4].

Jan 24, 2026 – The U.S. National Defense Strategy classifies North Korea as a direct military threat to South Korea and Japan, prompting potential revisions to U.S. force posture and deeper coordination with Seoul and Tokyo[9].

Jan 24, 2026 – South Korea’s National Defense Service warns that despite the aging and poorly managed North Korean conventional forces, Seoul must stay on high alert because the invasion risk remains unchanged[7].

Jan 24, 2026 – The strategy notes a shift in defense‑responsibility balance, with the United States planning to update United States Forces Korea (USFK) posture to reflect South Korea’s expanded primary role in deterrence[8].

Jan 26, 2026 – Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby posts on X from Seoul that South Korea is a “model ally” after Seoul formally pledges to spend 3.5 % of GDP on defense, aligning with the new National Defense Strategy’s burden‑sharing emphasis[5].

Jan 26, 2026 – South Korean Defense Minister Ahn meets Colby in Seoul to discuss nuclear‑powered submarine cooperation, wartime operational‑control transfer, and the new U.S. strategy that envisions Seoul taking “primary” responsibility for deterrence with “critical but more limited” U.S. support[6].

Jan 27, 2026 – The Department of Defense releases the 2026 National Defense Strategy, urging allies such as South Korea to assume primary defense responsibility while the United States offers “critical but more limited” support, and omits any reference to North Korean denuclearization or an extended nuclear umbrella[2].

Jan 27, 2026 – The strategy further frames the United States’ posture as “America First,” focusing on protecting the homeland and key Western‑Hemisphere sites, while positioning China as the primary strategic concern and treating North Korea as a permanent nuclear problem rather than a target for denuclearization[3].

Jan 27, 2026 – North Korean leader Kim Jong Un announces that the Workers’ Party of Korea will reveal next‑stage nuclear deterrent measures at the forthcoming party congress, tying the disclosure to the upcoming gathering and emphasizing the regime’s intent to strengthen its war‑deterrent capability[1].

2026‑2027 (future) – South Korea expects to complete the OPCON handover by the end of President Lee Jae‑Myung’s term in 2030, and aims to field a nuclear‑powered submarine as early as the mid‑2030s, pending successful fuel‑access negotiations with the United States[11].

2026 (future) – The United States plans to conduct a Nuclear Posture Review later in 2026, which Seoul hopes will provide clearer guarantees on extended deterrence and denuclearization commitments[2].

Early 2026 (within three months of Dec 2025) – The newly established U.S.–South Korea working groups on nuclear energy and submarines are scheduled to convene their first meetings, aiming to draft a joint framework for future negotiations[28].

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