1953 – The Korean Armistice Agreement ends active fighting, creates the 250‑km‑long, 4‑km‑wide DMZ and assigns the United Nations Command (UNC) as the administrator of civilian and military access, a framework that still governs the buffer zone [13].

2019 – A former unification minister is denied entry to the civilian village of Daeseongdong inside the DMZ, a precedent cited by current officials when arguing over civilian access [13].

Dec 3, 2025 – The UNC issues a statement that “the 1953 armistice agreement remains the binding framework” for all movement in the DMZ, while Unification Minister Chung Dong‑young reports a senior presidential security official was recently denied entry to White Horse Ridge, prompting the UNC’s clarification [13].

Dec 16, 2025 – The UNC reaffirms its administrative authority in a rare public release, citing the provision that “civil administration south of the Military Demarcation Line is the responsibility of the Commander‑in‑Chief, United Nations Command,” and warns that any shift could undermine the armistice [12].

Dec 17, 2025 – The UNC formally objects to South Korean legislation granting the government control over non‑military DMZ access, calling the proposals “completely at odds” with the armistice and stressing that “entry is limited to those conducting civil administration or relief, or those authorized by the Military Armistice Commission” [10][11][12].

Dec 17, 2025 – The UNC grants Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Hyun‑jong DMZ access for a briefing on North Korean military activities, demonstrating its continued role in managing limited civilian visits while maintaining oversight [10].

Dec 19, 2025 – U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson tells the War on the Rocks podcast that the DMZ “should not be politicized,” that the armistice “is the standard for behavior,” and that the United States will not block Seoul’s “conditions‑based handover of wartime operational control” before President Lee Jae Myung’s term ends in 2030 [9].

Dec 19, 2025 – South Korea and the United States hold their first comprehensive coordination talks on North Korea policy under the current administrations, while the UNC again objects to the DMZ‑access bill and North Korean female workers begin returning from Beijing amid tightened Chinese visa controls [7].

Dec 21, 2025 – The UNC issues a Dec 16 statement reaffirming its DMZ administration; ruling Democratic Party of Korea proposals would let the Unification Ministry approve civilian access in the southern DMZ, and Unification Minister Chung Dong‑young criticizes “complete UNC control of South Korean land” as out of step with public sentiment [8].

Jan 28, 2026 – The UNC declares the pending South Korean bills “completely at odds” with the armistice, warning that stripping the UNC commander of access‑control authority would place liability on the commander and could “politicize” the zone, potentially triggering hostilities [5][6].

Jan 29, 2026 – South Korea’s Unification Ministry announces that the draft legislation “does not conflict with the armistice at all” because it requires advance consultation with the UNC, and Unification Minister Chung Dong‑young reiterates that the bills “do not conflict with the armistice” and will not damage South Korea‑U.S. relations [2][3][4].

Jan 29, 2026 – The Defense Ministry spokesperson says the ministry “respects the UNC’s mandate under the armistice” and will work closely with it on any DMZ use, while the Foreign Ministry stresses the National Assembly’s legislative rights and the need to consider public aspirations for a peaceful DMZ [2].

Feb 4, 2026 – South Korea proposes that its forces jointly manage roughly 30 % of the southern half of the DMZ, seeking U.S. agreement to oversee civilian entry to zones south of the barbed‑wire fence; the proposal will be placed on the agenda of the upcoming Korea‑U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue and Security Consultative Meeting [1].

Feb 2026 (planned) – The joint‑partial‑management proposal is slated for discussion in the Korea‑U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue and the Security Consultative Meeting, signaling a potential shift toward greater South Korean civilian oversight of the DMZ pending U.S. consent [1].

2030 (future) – President Lee Jae Myung’s term ends in 2030, by which time a “conditions‑based handover of wartime operational control” is expected to be completed, according to Gen. Brunson’s remarks on the timeline for transferring operational authority [9].