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Freedom Shield Drill Delay Highlights Growing US‑Korea Tensions Amid Regional Nuclear Pressures

Updated (122 articles)
  • South Korean soldiers take part in joint drills with U.S. troops at an unspecified training field during the allies' Freedom Shield exercise period in this file photo provided by the Army on March 19, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
    South Korean soldiers take part in joint drills with U.S. troops at an unspecified training field during the allies' Freedom Shield exercise period in this file photo provided by the Army on March 19, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
    Image: Yonhap
    South Korean soldiers take part in joint drills with U.S. troops at an unspecified training field during the allies' Freedom Shield exercise period in this file photo provided by the Army on March 19, 2025. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap) Source Full size
  • U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un are seen before missiles in this Newsweek illustration.
    U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un are seen before missiles in this Newsweek illustration.
    Image: Newsweek
    U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un are seen before missiles in this Newsweek illustration. Source Full size
  • U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un are seen before missiles in this Newsweek illustration.
    U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un are seen before missiles in this Newsweek illustration.
    Image: Newsweek
    U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un are seen before missiles in this Newsweek illustration. Source Full size

Drill Date Announcement Delayed Over Training Dispute The South Korean and U.S. militaries postponed the public release of the spring Freedom Shield exercise date after the United States objected to Seoul’s proposal to cut on‑field training components [1]. A scheduled joint press briefing was cancelled when U.S. officials signaled reservations about the scaling‑back plan [1]. Both sides agreed to resume talks and set a new announcement window for late February or early March, while confirming the March drill will proceed as planned [1].

Seoul Seeks Scaled‑Back Drills as Diplomatic Overture President Lee Jae Myung’s administration pushed to reduce live‑field elements of the joint exercise, presenting the move as a conciliatory gesture toward North Korea [1]. The United States rejected the proposal despite already deploying additional troops and equipment for the exercise [1]. South Korean officials emphasized that the March Freedom Shield will focus on transferring wartime operational control to Korean forces [1].

Trump Intensifies Iran Pressure While North Korea Expands Nuclear Arsenal President Donald Trump increased military pressure on Iran, signaling possible action on earlier threats [2]. North Korea’s nuclear program now fields missiles capable of reaching the United States, granting the regime a deterrent status comparable to major powers [2]. Carnegie Endowment senior fellow Ankit Panda argued that this deterrence validates Kim Jong Un’s rule, especially after recent U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites [2].

North Korea Deepens Ties With Russia Amid Weak Sanctions Pyongyang reinforced its military partnership with Moscow, deploying roughly 10,000 Korean People’s Army personnel to Ukraine and signing a mutual defense pact in June 2024 [2]. Analysts noted that sanctions have limited impact, as North Korea generates substantial revenue through overseas smuggling and lucrative cybercrime operations [2]. The State Department continues to call for complete denuclearization, but current U.S. policy favors pressure over direct diplomatic engagement [2].

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Timeline

2006 – North Korea conducts its first nuclear test, launching a weapons program that expands over two decades into a deterrent capability comparable to the United States, China and Russia [1].

June 2024 – North Korea and Russia sign a mutual‑defense pact, the first formal agreement since the 1961 China‑North Korea treaty, and deploy an estimated 10,000 Korean People’s Army troops to fight in Ukraine [1].

Nov 30, 2025 – Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon‑joo lands in Washington to begin talks on implementing the joint fact sheet that pledges U.S. support for South Korea’s civil uranium enrichment and spent‑fuel reprocessing, while seeking a consultative channel to navigate 123‑Agreement limits [30].

Dec 1, 2025 – South Korea and the United States agree to launch sectoral working groups on nuclear‑energy and nuclear‑powered submarines; Park meets Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau to formalize the groups, request tariff cuts and confirm U.S. approval of submarine plans [26][27][28][29].

Dec 3, 2025 – First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon‑joo meets U.S. think‑tank leaders, reiterates Seoul’s strict non‑proliferation stance and urges Washington to back civil enrichment, reprocessing and submarine cooperation outlined in the November joint fact sheet [25].

Dec 5, 2025 – The U.S. National Security Strategy is released, emphasizing defense of the First Island Chain, urging higher defense spending by Seoul and Tokyo, and notably omitting any reference to North Korean denuclearization while approving South Korea’s nuclear‑powered submarine program [24].

Dec 6, 2025 – Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth declares that allies raising defense budgets—highlighting South Korea’s 3.5 % GDP pledge—will receive “special favor” from Washington, linking the commitment to broader Indo‑Pacific burden‑sharing [23].

Dec 7, 2025 – National Security Adviser Wi Sung‑lac states Seoul will not use joint U.S.–Korea drills as leverage in inter‑Korean talks, though he notes limited progress on dialogue and President Lee’s long‑term goal of scaling back large‑scale exercises [22].

Dec 9, 2025 – Foreign Minister Cho Hyun announces Seoul will accelerate cooperation with the United States on atomic energy and nuclear‑powered submarines, citing the two Lee‑Trump summits as a milestone and urging close, multi‑channel communication [21].

Dec 15, 2025 – U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Xavier Brunson stresses that joint drills are essential for readiness, while Unification Minister Chung Dong‑young proposes adjustments to encourage North Korean dialogue, recalling past suspensions of Team Spirit in 1992, 1994 and the 2018 drill delay [19].

Dec 15, 2025 – South Korea and the United States conduct the fourth “Winter Tiger” joint drill on nuclear and radiological terrorism response in Seoul, involving roughly 120 officials and building on the exercise’s 2017 inception [20].

Dec 15, 2025 – National Security Adviser Wi Sung‑lac outlines a Washington visit to discuss nuclear‑powered submarines, civil uranium enrichment and spent‑fuel reprocessing, noting three task forces prepared for the negotiations [18].

Dec 16, 2025 – Wi announces Seoul will explore a separate bilateral agreement with the United States, modeled on Australia’s Section 91 arrangement, to secure nuclear material for submarines while continuing work on enrichment and reprocessing [16].

Dec 16, 2025 – The United States confirms backing for South Korea’s nuclear‑powered submarine bid and civil fuel‑cycle projects after President Lee’s Gyeongju summit with Trump, though non‑proliferation concerns persist [17].

Dec 17, 2025 – Wi meets Energy Secretary Chris Wright in Washington, advancing talks on civil uranium enrichment, spent‑fuel reprocessing and a possible Section 91 exception for submarine fuel [15].

Dec 18, 2025 – South Korea’s defense ministry says it will seek U.S. negotiations on nuclear fuel for submarines, aiming to finish talks within two years, linking the effort to an OPCON retake by 2030 and a full‑operational‑capability review at the November 2026 defense chiefs’ meeting [14].

Dec 18, 2025 – Wi reports progress in senior‑level U.S. talks to accelerate implementation of summit agreements on enrichment, reprocessing and submarines, though specifics remain undisclosed [13].

Dec 20, 2025 – Officials confirm that parallel working‑level discussions on civil uranium enrichment, spent‑fuel reprocessing and nuclear‑powered submarines will launch in early 2026, with separate task forces ready for each track [12].

Dec 21, 2025 – Wi announces simultaneous talks slated for early 2027 on summit commitments, and plans a visit to Japan to discuss trilateral cooperation and a Korea‑Japan summit scheduled for the following month [11].

Dec 24, 2025 – South Korean security adviser clarifies that there is no current plan to acquire highly enriched uranium for a nuclear‑powered submarine program, distinguishing civil enrichment from weapons‑grade material [10].

Jan 7, 2026 – Pentagon Under Secretary for Policy Elbridge Colby mulls back‑to‑back trips to South Korea and Japan later in January, with an agenda expected to cover Seoul’s defense‑spending increase, OPCON transition and submarine plans [9].

Jan 9, 2026 – South Korea creates an interagency team led by Rim Kap‑soo to coordinate upcoming U.S. talks on civil uranium enrichment and spent‑fuel reprocessing, aiming to amend the 123 Agreement for standing approval [8].

Jan 26, 2026 – Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby posts on X from Seoul that South Korea is a “model ally” after its pledge to spend 3.5 % of GDP on defense, coinciding with the release of a new U.S. National Defense Strategy [7].

Jan 30, 2026 – South Korea and Japan resume bilateral naval search‑and‑rescue drills for the first time since 2017, after defense ministers meet in Yokosuka and agree to personnel and unit exchanges as confidence‑building measures [6].

Feb 4, 2026 – South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright reaffirm commitments to accelerate civil uranium enrichment, spent‑fuel reprocessing and the development of nuclear‑powered submarines, citing the November joint fact sheet from the August and October summits [5].

Feb 5, 2026 – The U.S. State Department reiterates its extended nuclear deterrence guarantee to South Korea; Deputy Spokesperson Mignon Houston praises President Trump as a “president of peace,” warns of North Korean missile threats, and notes trade‑tariff tensions over a stalled bilateral deal [4].

Feb 6, 2026 – South Korean Army Chief Gen. Kim Gyu‑ha and U.S. Army Pacific Commander Gen. Ronald P. Clark hold a video call, reviewing the Korean Peninsula security environment and pledging deeper cooperation ahead of the May LANPAC Symposium [3].

Feb 20, 2026 – President Donald Trump intensifies military pressure on Iran, while North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watches under the protection of a nuclear arsenal that now rivals great powers; analysts cite the June 2024 Russia‑North Korea defense pact and the deployment of 10,000 KPA troops in Ukraine as evidence of NK’s de‑facto nuclear status [1].

Feb 22, 2026 – South Korea and the United States postpone announcing the spring Freedom Shield drill date after the U.S. objects to Seoul’s proposal to scale back on‑field training, but confirm the March exercise will proceed normally to maintain readiness against North Korea’s advancing weapons programs [2].

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